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JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE
RECENT ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BANKING REGULATORS *
LAWRENCE G. BAXTER **
INTRODUCTIONW 0 among us would want to be the author of a treatise on interna-
W Ytional relations, publication date January 1989? Perhaps worse,
who would like to be the author of such a treatise, publication date July
31, 1990? Like the Defenestration of Prague on Ascension Day, May 23,
1618,1 irritable-even tragi-comical--events were only dimly perceived
as portending the avalanche of change during the past two years. So too,
the disputes between Don Regan and Ed Gray,2 the delay by Speaker Jim
Wright of the passage of the first of the bailout measures in 1987,3 and
the skirmishes between the banking agencies and the banking industry
* Paper presented on April 12, 1991, as part of the Fordham University School of
Law's Graduate Colloquium 1990-1991, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration.
This paper is a pilot for a study being prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United States on the enforcement powers of the federal banking agencies. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Conference, its members or its staff. The author wishes to thank Paul H. Haagen, Dennis
J. Lehr, Roy A. Schotland, Peter H. Schuck and Peter L. Strauss for their generous and
helpful comments on drafts of this paper. Special thanks are also due to Brian C.
Murphy for enthusiastically and energetically securing much of the material on which the
paper is based.
** Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. See G. Parker, Europe in Crisis: 1598-1648, 13 (1979).
2. See, e.g., M. Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Sav-
ings and Loan Industry 133-39, 157-58 (1990) [hereinafter Mayer, Bank Robbery]
(describing the disputes between the White House Chief of Staff and the Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) over the latter's efforts to restrict the use by
S&Ls of brokered deposits and direct investments, the former's opposition to the "reregu-
lation" of the S&L industry, and Regan's efforts to have Gray replaced as chairman of
the FHLBB); J. R. Adams, The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal 235-37 (1990) [herein-
after Adams, Big Fix] (Gray's clashes with Regan); S. Pizzo, M. Fricker & P. Muolo,
Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans 177-84 (1989) [hereinafter
Pizzo et al., Inside Job] (similar). But cf. L. J. White, The S&L Debacle: Public Policy
Lessons for bank and Thrift Regulation 126-28 (1991) [hereinafter White, Debacle] (ex-
plaining why the FHLBB's efforts to restrict brokered deposits was "misguided").
3. See House Comm. on Standards of Official Conduct, Rep. of the Special Outside
Counsel in the Matter of Speaker James C. Wright, Jr., 101st Cong., 209-13 (1989). See
generally, e.g., Mayer, Bank Robbery, supra note 2, 230-33; Pizzo, et al., Inside Job, supra
note 2, 212-18; Adams, Big Fix, supra note 2, ch. 12.
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over the scope of the agencies' enforcement powers4 hardly alerted the
nation to the crisis that was soon to break in the savings and loan and
banking industries.
Yet, as we now know, all these events were symptoms of malaises that
had surreptitiously corrupted the entire systems in which they took
place. They were the signals of collapse, of the imminent demise of old
orders and emergence of new ones. It is always difficult in the midst of
such changes to identify from whence we have come and discern whither
we are going. In the case of the S&L and banking crises, however, pat-
terns are beginning to emerge.
In this paper I will examine the changing roles of the courts and the
agencies in the enforcement of federal banking legislation in the wake of
the Savings and Loan Crisis. These changing roles are reflections of the
fundamental transformations that are occurring both within the financial
services industry and in the broader political and regulatory environ-
ments. I will seek to demonstrate that, contrary to long-standing as-
sumptions, parties challenging banking agency enforcement action on
judicial review are frequently successful, and that it is quite possible that
the courts will become even more active in striking down or modifying
enforcement activities.
Two explanations will be offered for why judicial activism will con-
tinue and may even increase. First, the enforcement agencies are afflicted
with conflicting missions concerning the maintenance of depository insti-
tution safety and soundness and the cleanout of the thrift and banking
industries. This multi-faceted effort appears to be generating a substan-
tial volume of litigation which, in turn, has led to a surprising degree of
judicial intervention against the banking agencies. Second, the unprece-
dented exposure of taxpayers to the risk of depository institution failure
is forcing the banking agencies to adopt a vigorous, formalistic, and un-
duly punitive approach to banking supervision. A regulatory model
(which I call the "entrepreneurial state") has evolved, in which the agen-
cies are, I will argue, obliged to engage in the secondary management of
depository institutions by means of coercive enforcement techniques that
seem sometimes inappropriate to the task. This is an approach that
could be at least partly ineffective and possibly even counterproductive.
In conclusion, three lines of inquiry are proposed. First, the conflict of
missions already referred to suggests a need for a greater degree of sepa-
ration between the agencies that engage in general banking supervision
and those that are charged with cleaning out the deadwood in the indus-
try. Second, a clearer distinction should be drawn between the forms of
enforcement action that are designed to exact retribution, reimbursement
and compensation, and those that are designed primarily to prevent fur-
4. See Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1986);
Stoddard v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1989); see also infra text accompanying notes 23-91.
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ther deterioration in the institutions concerned. An acknowledgment of
this distinction leads to the third and final inquiry, namely whether there
should be instituted a greater degree of procedural and/or structural sep-
aration between the agency "prosecutors" (those initiating and prosecut-
ing punitive enforcement actions) and the banking "supervisors" (those
who require enforcement powers in order to prevent the failure of
institutions).
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
A. The Old World Order
The world of community banking, rendered secure for the nation by
'Old Hickory' Jackson in 1832 when he vetoed the extension of the char-
ter of the Second Bank of the United States,- and particularly the world
of buildings associations and savings and loans, long functioned under
the gentlest glow of public scrutiny. The traditional image of the local
savings and loan association has been one of an institution intimately
concerned with the savings and housing welfare of the neighborhood. As
reporters of the S&L Crisis are wont to observe, this image was well
captured (perhaps it is more accurate to say, nurtured) by Frank Capra's
nostalgic 1946 movie, It's a WonderfulLife, in which the hero (played by
James Stewart) refuses to capitulate to the predations of the local bank-
ing competitor and, at the brink of catastrophe, is saved by the support of
a grateful and loyal community.
Of course, as the movie itself illustrates, there are good bankers and
bad bankers, but the banking and thrift industries enjoyed, in 1946 and
for another three to four decades, an almost unrivalled reputation for
integrity, public-spiritedness and cooperative disposition toward federal
and state regulators. Yet this did not mean that the industry was not
heavily regulated: on the contrary, it has been, as the Supreme Court put
it in 1947, "one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of
public callings." 6 The banking agencies had promulgated regulations
governing the powers of the industry "from its cradle to its corporate
grave," 7 and the regulators.have long been "equipped with a formidable
array of sanctions."'
Partly because of this regulatory intensity--this paternalistic ap-
5. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 413 (1987) (Stevens, J., con-
curring, quoting the homily paid to President Andrew Jackson by Sen. Reed, during
Congressional debate in 1925, for exercising his veto).
6. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947).
7. People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951);
see also Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982)(quot-
ing Coast Federal).
8. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 329 (1963).
9. "Partly" because there were surely many other contributing factors, such as the
relative simplicity and narrow scope of the financial services industry, lack of competition
from other quarters, and a shared creed among bankers and regulators, that contributed
to its stability and cooperative disposition. See generally Department of the Treasury,
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proach to banking regulation-the banking industry as a whole repre-
sented perhaps the last vestige of the "associational" ideal of the Hoover
era.1" The prestigious and scholarly studies by the Attorney General's
Committee of the federal banking agencies1" emphasized the need to
treat the banking agencies differently from other federal agencies: the
guarantees to members of the industry against arbitrariness and indis-
criminate punishment at the hands of the agencies came not from proce-
dural formalities but from the very nature of the agencies' supervision' 2
involving, as it did then (and still does), a close and continuous relation-
ship between the regulators and the regulated, such that the resort to
formal enforcement procedure was an exceedingly rare event. 3 Speaking
in reference to the enforcement powers of the Comptroller and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the Committee con-
cluded that
The paradox in the situation is that the sanctions are so compelling
that the authorities almost never use them. Because the banks are so
important in an industrial-commercial economy, compulsive steps
which might shake confidence are withheld. Although there is in fact
an iron hand within the velvet glove of the banking authorities, the
glove is seldom removed.14
A decade or so later the efficacy of this system of paternalistic, associa-
tional regulation was celebrated by one of the Committee's researchers
(by then one of the foremost authorities on federal administrative law),
Kenneth Culp Davis, as "superior in its efficiency" and "one of the most
successful" systems of regulation then extant in federal governance.' 5 As
Modernizing The Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive
Banks 1-25-27 (1991)[hereinafter "Modernizing the Financial System"](tracing changes
in the financial marketplace as a contributory factor in increasing the instability of the
banking industry); White, Debacle, supra note 2, 58-61 (describing the conditions in
which thrifts operated during the postwar years of prosperity).
10. See T. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation ch. 4 (1984); Rabin, Federal Regulation
in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1236-42 (1986).
11. See Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, Monograph of the Attor-
ney General's Comm. on Admin. Procedure, part 9, Federal Reserve System; id. part 13,
Federal Control of Banking: Comptroller of the Cusrency and Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)[hereinafter Monograph].
12. See Monograph, supra note 11, part 9, at 32; see also id. part 13, at 42-43.
13.
The marked informality of the [Federal Reserve] Board's procedure is readily
explicable. So complete have been the pre-hearing conferences and examina-
tions, and so reluctant has the Board been to proceed, that the hearing and the
ultimate decision is and can be little more than a formal gesture superimposed
upon what everyone, including the respondents, concede is a fait accompli....
The respondent's attitude is significantly reflected in his unconcern as to
whether he is to be heard before the Board, as he may elect, or before a
subordinate, and by his failure to exercise the granted right of arguing before or
submitting briefs to the Board.
Monograph, supra note 11, part 9, at 31.
14. Id. part 13, at 18.




[t]he striking fact is that whereas the nonbanking agencies administer
their systems of requiring licenses and approvals by conducting formal
adjudications in most cases involving controversies, the banking agen-
cies use methods of informal supervision, almost always without for-
mal adjudication, even for the determination of controversies. The
contrast is a striking one with respect to each parallel problem; for
instance, the problem of the extent of community need is about the
same whether the application is for establishment of a bank, a televi-
sion station, or an airline, and yet the problem is handled in the bank-
ing field by the methods of the businessman and in the other fields by
the methods of the judge in his courtroom.16
Hence, as the Court noted in the Philadelphia National Bank case in
1962, "recommendations by the agencies concerning banking practices
tend to be followed by bankers without the necessity of formal compli-
ance proceedings."'" "To the efficacy of this system," Justice Brennan
went on to remark, "we may owe, in part, the virtual disappearance of
bank failures."18
Professor Davis was referring more directly to the chartering powers
of the banking agencies than to their ensuing enforcement powers, but, as
the observations of the Attorney General's Committee indicate, his com-
ments seem to have been equally applicable to the latter. Because formal
enforcement action was so rarely taken, litigation between the banking
agencies and members of the industry appears largely to have been con-
fined to entry and expansion disputes concerning matters like chartering,
branching and product offerings. When enforcement actions were chal-
lenged, the courts accorded the agencies a degree of deference commen-
surate with the high standing of the agencies, the highly autonomous
nature of banking regulation itself, and the relatively low level of pain
inflicted by the enforcement sanctions.19 Even where there was no ex-
plicit statutory authority for the agency pressure, the courts remained
tolerant. In 1958, for example, a panel of the Fifth Circuit rejected a
complaint that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") had
placed improper pressure on the directors of an S&L to resign, observing
that "[w]hen a governmental agency holds such great powers over its
offspring, even to the point of appointing a conservator or receiver to
replace the management. . ., it is difficult to hold that an informal re-
quest, even demand, to clean house would amount to an abuse of the
16. Id. Professor Davis subsequently modified his views. See Davis, Administrative
Procedure in the Regulation of Banking, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 713 (1966). Perhaps
sensing the portents of things to come, the discussion of banking supervision was dropped
from the second edition of his treatise in 1978.
17. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. at 330.
18. Id.
19. The development of a variety of graduated sanctions really only began in 1966,
and even then these sanctions were quite mild by comparison with those now available to
the banking agencies. See infra, text accompanying notes 59-64.
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statutory powers and discretion of the agency."2 It was possible for a
banking lawyer to observe as recently as 1988 that "the traditional pos-
ture of reviewing courts" and the "traditional result in enforcement
cases," when a banking agency is challenged in court, is that "the agency
wins."'" The courts continue to incant, whenever a banking agency's
enforcement action is challenged, that the agency is entitled to extreme
deference on judicial review.22
B. Transformation of the Regulatory Landscape
In little more than a decade the environment of banking regulation has
completely changed. When it was a "wonderful life," the regulators pos-
sessed "life and death" powers that, precisely because they were so se-
vere, never had to be exercised.23 The Fed could seek cancellation of the
rights and privileges of membership, thereby effectively terminating the
existence of a national bank,24 and could expel a member bank from
membership of the Federal Reserve System.25 The Fed and the Comp-
troller could, in limited circumstances, remove directors and officers of
national and state member banks.26 The Comptroller could revoke the
charters of national banks,2 7 and both the Comptroller and the FHLBB
could seize national banks and federal S&Ls, respectively, and place
them in receivership;2" the FHLBB could terminate the membership of
thrifts in the Home Loan Bank System;29 and the FDIC and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC") could terminate
federal deposit insurance.30
20. Miami Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 414-15 (5th
Cir. 1958) (quoted recently by Justice White in United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267,
1279 (1991)). The court in Miami Beach acknowledged that the threat of serious sanc-
tions was, "[r]ealistically.... the only pressure a representative of the Board could ex-
ert," and that the directors could have refused to comply with the alleged demands.
Miami Beach, 256 F.2d at 415.
21. Huber, Enforcement Powers of Federal Banking Agencies, 7 Ann. Rev. Banking L.
123, 168 (1988).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99. A similar attitude of deference pre-
vailed even with regard to chartering and branching decisions, at least until 1965. See
Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal Banking Agencies, 42
U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 244-49 (1975).
23. For a comprehensive review of the early enforcement powers of the banking agen-
cies, see generally Huber, supra note 21; M. A. Cobb, Federal Regulation of Depository
Institutions: Enforcement Powers and Procedures (1984 & 1989 Cum. Supp. 1989)
[hereinafter Cobb, Enforcement Powers, and Cobb, Supplement]. See also R. Serino, The
Intermediate Administrative Remedies of the Comptroller of the Currency (Rutgers
Univ. thesis 1975).
24. See 12 U.S.C. § 501a (1988).
25. See 12 U.S.C. § 327 (1988).
26. See 12 U.S.C. § 77 (repealed 1966).
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1988).
28. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 1821(c) (1988)(Comptroller); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(d)(2) (1988) (FHLBB).
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1426(i) (1988).
30. See, eg., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1988)(FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 1730(b) (1988)(FSLIC).
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But as the industry grew more diverse and the degree of voluntary
compliance began to recede, it became evident that these sanctions were
too crude, too blunt, and too slow for efficient regulation; the regulators
needed more refined instruments.3' In 1966 Congress first responded by
granting the agencies temporary and permanent cease-and-desist powers,
and modified suspension, removal and prohibition powers.32 Even then,
however, an assumption persisted that these powers would only be neces-
sary in the event of a worst-case scenario, and that the role of the federal
regulators in the exercise of their enforcement powers against state-
chartered institutions was to be properly confined according to the divi-
sion of powers between state and federal government: "The purpose of
the [federal] enforcement provisions" was "to quickly stop fraudulent
practices, not to affirmatively recover for them."33 The power of recov-
ery had been allocated (appropriately, it was assumed) to the relevant
state authorities.'
The need for even more differentiated enforcement powers persisted,
however, and in 1978 Congress further augmented the existing array of
sanctions possessed by the banking agencies. Congress also granted them
the power, then becoming increasingly common among federal agen-
cies,35 to impose modest civil money penalties upon industry recalci-
trants.36 Even so, this more complex array of sanctions remained
relatively dormant during the Seventies, as the banking agencies contin-
ued to rely primarily upon informality, negotiation and moral suasion in
order to secure regulatory compliance.
Then came a series of developments, the combined effects of which,
given the prevailing economic context, led to disastrous results.37
Among these was the general move toward banking "deregulation," a
program that took many forms from the reduction in product, market
and interest-rate restrictions3 to the provision of substantial degrees of
31. See, e.g., Huber, supra note 21, at 130-31.
32. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028 (1966).
33. Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D. Nev.
1969). The court recognized the power of FSLIC to sue under assignment of rights, but
not independently, for recovery with respect to injuries suffered by an insured association
as result of fraud. See id,
34. Id. See also 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3532, 3538, 3547.
35. See Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by the Federal
Administrative Agencies, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1435 (1979); Goldschmidt, An Evaluation of
the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Adminis-
trative Agencies, 2 Rec. & Rep. Admin. Conference U.S. 896.
36. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 [hereinafter Interest Rate Control Act]. The agencies
were limited to the imposition of a maximum amount of $1,000 per day. See id.
37. See generally White, Debacle, supra note 2, chs. 4-7; Symposium, Savings & Loan
Crisi. Lessons and Look Ahead, 2 Stan. L. & Pol. Rev. 12-158 (1990).
38. See Interest Rate Control Act, supra note 36, (partially increasing the ceiling on
federal deposit insurance); the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter DIDMCA](mandating the
phasing out of Regulation Q governing interest rates, generally increasing federal deposit
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regulatory supervisory relief, partly because of efforts to reduce agency
staff and costs,39 and partly in response to the cry for "forbearance."
Forbearance was the concept punted by the S&L industry and sympa-
thetic politicians in order to prevent thrifts, which the industry believed
were merely suffering from the effects of temporary adverse economic
conditions, from being seized by the FHLBB.4° Another development-
which reduced market discipline at the very time when deregulation pre-
supposed the operation of market forces-was the substantial increase in
the coverage of federal deposit insurance or, in other words, the expan-
sion of the federal safety net." The overall cohesion and internal disci-
pline of the industry eroded rapidly, and the agencies found themselves
increasingly having to rely upon their formal enforcement powers to se-
cure industry compliance both with federal laws and regulations and
with ever-broadening concepts of safety and soundness."2
As S&Ls and banks started to fail at alarming rates, the congressional
committees began to react, and the reaction took a form that has become
all-too-familiar in recent years: the agencies were excoriated for .lax en-
forcement.43 The perception that lax enforcement has been at least
partly to blame for the S&L crisis continued to intensify during the latter
half of the 1980s,4 with the agencies themselves rapidly revising in an
insurance from $40,000 to $100,000, and permitting banks and S&Ls to offer negotiable
order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 [hereinafter Garn-St. Germain] (permitting S&Ls
to offer money market accounts, engage in agricultural and commercial lending, accept
demand deposits from individuals and commercial corporations, make increased amounts
of consumer loans; increasing the amounts of loans that depository institutions could
make to one borrower).
39. See, e.g., Report of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Af-
fairs, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep.
No. 101-54, pt. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1989) (describing the difficulties in federal
hiring, competition to deregulate at state level, and the huge reduction in California of
supervisory and enforcement staff); see also White, Debacle, supra note 2, 88-91 (docu-
menting the dramatic reduction in FHLBB's field force regulatory scrutiny during the
early 1980s); Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Part-
ner, 1990 Duke L.J. 967, 976-77 (describing the refusal by the Office of Management and
Budget to cooperate with the efforts of FHLBB chairman Edwin Gray to increase or even
prevent the reduction of the FSLIC's examination staff).
40. On the forbearance programs developed by the FHLBB and partly authorized by
Congress in the Garn-St Germain and Competitive Equality Banking Acts, see E. Kane,
The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did it Happen? 51-57 (1989); Modernizing the Financial
System, supra note 9, at 1-20, 37-38; Mayer, Bank Robbery, supra note 2, at 156; White,
Debacle, supra note 2, 139-42.
41. See supra note 38.
42. See, e.g., Cobb, Supplement, supra note 23, S3-3-S3-4 (describing trends in en-
forcement during the 1980s).
43. See Comm. on Government Operations Fifty-seventh Report, Federal Response
to Criminal Misconduct and Insider Abuse in the Nation's Financial Institutions, H.
Rep. No. 98-1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
44. See Comm. on Government Operations Seventy-second Report, Combating
Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation's Financial Institutions: Current Federal
Efforts are Inadequate, H. Rep. 100-1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); General Ac-
counting Office, Troubled Thrifts: Bank Board Use of Enforcement Actions, GAO/
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upwards direction their estimates of the proportion of "insider abuse,"45
thereby helping to sharpen the focus of regulatory reform in large mea-
sure upon the need for a dramatic enhancement of agency enforcement
powers.' The United States Attorney General added his own endorse-
ment to this diagnosis and prognosis.'
By the time of the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Re-
covery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),4 s legislators were
satisfied that an important factor contributing to the failure to prevent
the epidemic of thrift and bank failures was the inadequate enforcement
powers (and enforcement efforts) of the Federal regulators.49 More than
convinced of the need for a massive increase in the range and scale of the
enforcement powers possessed not only by the banking agencies but also
by the Attorney General, Congress swept aside objections by industry
GGD-89-68BR (1989); Troubled Thrifts: Use of Supervisory Enforcement Actions,
GAO/GGD-89-105BR (1989). Cf N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went
Wrong: A Look at the Causes Behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s, ch. 10
(1988).
45. A term that is used indiscriminately to cover all forms of misdeed, from serious
errors of judgment and regulatory violations to outright fraud and other criminality.
The term "fraud" is bandied about as if the entire thrift industry were pervaded by
fraudulent activity. This has no doubt spurred the nearly-hysterical reaction in Congress,
but it is a gross exaggeration. See J.R. Barth, The Great Savings and Loan Debacle 44
(1991); cf White, Debacle, supra note 2, at 117 ("The bulk of the insolvent thrifts'
problems... did not stem from such fraudulent criminal activities (as those described in
popular accounts of the crisis]. These thrifts largely failed because of an amalgam of
deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business judgments, foolish strategies, excessive op-
timism, and sloppy and careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real estate
markets") (emphasis in original). But cf. Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct
in Financial Institution." A Crisis?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 222, 225-28 (1989).
46. See Hearings on HR. 1278 Before the Criminal Justice Subcomm. of the House
Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Rosemary Stewart, then
Director of Enforcement, FHLBB) (52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 734 (1989)). As Ms. Stew-
art noted elsewhere, the regulators, and particularly the FHLBB, had been trying to se-
cure enhanced enforcement powers for some time. See FHLBB, Justice Dept Lawyers
Outline S&L Bill Criminal Provisions at D.C Meeting, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1150
(1989). A number of enforcement bills had been introduced in Congress.
47. See Fraud in the Savings and Loan Association Area: Hearings on S 413 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
(statement of Dick Thornburgh, United States Attorney General); see also Fraud in
America's Depository Institutions: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 55 S.H.R.G. 1130 (1990) (statements of
Richard L. Fogel, Ass't Comptroller General, and Benton E. Cup, Chairman of Banking,
University of Alabama) (offering assessments of role of fraud in depository institutions);
Include $50 Million in S&L Reform Bill, Att'y General Thornburgh Urges Congress, 53
Banking Rep. (BNA) 44 (1989); Hearings on HR. 1278 Before the Subcomm. on Crimi-
nal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement
of Joe Whitley, United States Assistant Attorney General).
48. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
49. See Report of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-54,
Pt. 1, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 464-65 (1989); Report of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, S. Rep. No. 101-19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1989).
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representatives5 ° and conferred upon the federal banking regulators the
most extensive array of administrative sanctions ever possessed by Amer-
ican administrative agencies.5
Among the most important enforcement enhancements initiated by
FIRREA are the following. FIRREA introduced the generic concept of
an "institution-affiliated party" to cover persons such as directors, of-
ficers, employees, agents and "other persons participating in the affairs"
of an institution.52 This has greatly extended the potential subjects of
enforcement action, who now expressly include attorneys, appraisers and
accountants."3 Cease-and-desist authority was expanded to include ex-
pressly the power of banking agencies to order restitution or reimburse-
ment, indemnification, guaranty against loss, as well as to order
affirmative corrective action. 4 It has also been made easier for agencies
to issue temporary cease-and-desist orders.55 Removal, suspension and
prohibition orders are also now easier to obtain 6 and, perhaps more im-
portantly, removal and prohibition orders can be made on an industry-
wide basis.5 Such orders can now also be made against institution-affili-
ated parties who have already resigned, been terminated or have relin-
50. Members and representatives of the banking industry protested that the enhanced
enforcement powers under FIRREA would be so severe as to deter able persons from
accepting positions in banking institutions and to discourage cooperative negotiation be-
tween the industry and regulators, thus doing the industry more harm than good. See,
e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1278 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Judici-
ary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statements of Edward Yingling, Executive
Director of Government Relations for the American Bankers' Association, and John
Villa, banking attorney); see also FHLBB, Justice Dept. Lawyers Outline S&L Bill Crimi-
nal Provisions at D.C. Meeting, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1150 (1989). The then FDIC
General Counsel, John Douglas, publicly acknowledged this danger. See S&L Bill's En-
forcement Provisions Could Hinder Negotiations, FDIC Attorney Says, 52 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 1060 (1989).
51. See FIRREA, Title IX. For a thorough analysis, see generally Malloy, Nothing to
Fear But FIRREA Itself, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 1117 (1989); see also M. Malloy, The Corporate
Law of Banks 101-33, § 3.2.6b (1990 Cum. Supp.) [hereinafter Malloy, 1990 Supp.]; Mc-
Spadden & Byrne, FIRREA Expands Civil Enforcement Powers of Regulators, Increases
Penalties Allowed, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 427 (1989); Villa, Reform Act Builds Regula-
tors'Arsenal, Am. Banker, Oct. 11, 1989 at 5-6, col. 1.
52. FIRREA, §§ 204(f)(6)(u), 901(a)(r), 103 Stat. at 193, 446 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1813(u), 1786(r)).
53. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4). For an analysis, see Kawasaki, Liability of At-
torneys, Accountants, Appraisers, and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 Hastings LJ. 249 (1990);
see also infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
54. See FIRREA, §§ 902(a)(1)(C), 902(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 450, 451 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
55. Id. §§ 902(a)(2)(A), 902(b)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 451, 452 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1818(b)).
56. See id. §§ 903(a)(1), 903(b)(1), 103 Stat. at 453, 455 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(e)(1)). FIRREA no longer requires "substantial" financial loss or "serious preju-
dice" to be shown. See id.
57. See id. §§ 903(a)(3), (b)(3), 904(a), 904(b), 103 Stat. at 453, 455, 457, 458 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)).
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quished their relationship with the depository institution.58
Most significant of all, the occasions for, and amounts of, civil money
penalties that can be imposed by both the agencies and the courts on
institutions and institution-affiliated parties have been dramatically in-
creased. There are numerous FIRREA provisions governing civil penal-
ties: in the case of agency (as opposed to judicial 9) enforcement
proceedings, three tiers of penalties have been created. The first tier con-
sists of a maximum penalty of $5,000 per day for violations of laws, regu-
lations, written conditions and agreements.' The second tier prescribes
a maximum penalty of $25,000 per day in the case of reckless engage-
ment in unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duties, and
where the violation is part of a pattern of misconduct that causes more
than minimal loss to the institution, or gain to the party.6" The third tier
imposes as much as $1 million per day liability where the institution or
party knowingly or recklessly causes substantial loss or gain through the
violation.62 For the first time, final enforcement orders and modifications
of all such orders were required to be published.63
To prove that Congress was serious, the relevant legislative provisions
were accompanied by exhortations from Congress to deploy these new
powers to the maximum extent feasible: speaking in reference to the civil
money penalty powers conferred by FIRREA, the Conferees urged that
they be used without hesitation:
By greatly expanding the scope of misconduct covered by the civil pen-
alty provisions and by making substantial increases to the penalty
amounts, the Conferees intend for the Federal banking agencies to ag-
gressively utilize this new authority, whenever it is justified in law and
by the facts.64
Nor were the enhanced sanctions contained in Title IX of FIREA
the only aspects of enforcement that Congress addressed. Another factor
that had been identified as aggravating the S&L Crisis was the failure of
the regulators to seize institutions before they became so hopelessly insol-
vent that their insured deposits were too expensive for the federal insur-
ance funds to cover. "Forbearance"'65 was identified as a source of the
problem, and the need for "early intervention" was (and continues to be)
58. See FIRREA, §§ 905(a), 905(b), 103 Stat. at 459, 460 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)); infra note 165. Similar amendments were effected in various related banking
statutes. See Malloy, Nothing to Fear But FIRREA Itself, 50 Ohio St. LJ. 1117, 1151
n.326 (1989).
59. FIRREA § 951 prescribes judicially-imposed civil penalties of as much as S5 mil-
lion for certain violations of provisions in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
60. See FIRREA, § 907(a), 103 Stat. at 462 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(1)).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 913, 103 Stat. at 483.
64. See, eg., Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1278, Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, H.R. Rep. No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 440 (1989).
65. See supra note 40.
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prescribed as a cure.66 To this end, Congress greatly facilitated the early
seizure of depository institutions by the federal regulators through a vari-
ety of mechanisms, some direct and others more indirect.
One direct mechanism was an enlargement of the conditions under
which a federal or state financial institution could be seized by the federal
regulators and placed in conservatorship or receivership.67 Simultane-
ously, indirect mechanisms increased the likelihood that the conditions
for seizure would exist. Perhaps most important was the enhancement of
capital standards as a focus of safety and soundness,6" such that institu-
tions that could not comply with the new and more intense capital re-
quirements imposed by FIRREA or the agencies would be in greater
danger of being judged to be unsafe and unsound and would therefore be
more exposed to enforcement action (including seizure). The agencies
added their own indirect mechanisms. For example, the Fed, with possi-
ble tacit endorsement by Congress,6 9 attempted to expand the application
66. See, e.g., Report of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
supra note 49, at 298 (identifying "regulatory and statutory accounting gimmicks," which
facilitated the program of forbearance, as a source of the S&L crisis). Early intervention
and prompt corrective action on the part of regulators continues to animate some of the
most significant proposals for banking reform currently on the legislative agenda. See
Modernizing the Financial System, supra note 9, 41 (the basis for the Treasury Depart-
ment's bill, Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 1505,
which contains Subtitle E and is devoted to Prompt Corrective Action enforcement pro-
visions); S. 543 (Riegle Bill requiring prompt corrective action by regulators, and strongly
supported in recent congressional testimony by outside experts); H.R. 6 (House Banking
Committee's bill requiring same); see also General Accounting Office, Deposit Insurance:
A Strategy for Reform (GAO/GGD-91-26 1991) Ch. 3 (recommending earlier and more
forceful intervention by regulators) [hereinafter "Strategy for Reform"]; Three Banking
Experts Strongly Support Prompt Action Provisions in Reigle Bill, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA)
503, 505 (1991)); Bacon, Bruised by the S&L Fiasco, Lawmakers Now Try to Show they
are Born Again Bank Guardians, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1991, at A26, col. 1.
67. See, e.g., FIRREA, § 204(x), 103 Stat. at 193-94 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813)(definitions of default); id. § 212(a), 103 Stat. at 222-24 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1821) (amending Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 11(c)(4)&(5) concerning the
grounds upon which the FDIC can appoint itself as conservator or receiver of a federally
insured state depository institution); id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 282 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1464) (amending Home Owners' Loan Act § 5(d)(2) concerning the grounds for
which the Director of OTS can appoint a conservator or receiver for a federal savings
association); id. § 802, 103 Stat. at 442 (amending § 203(a) of the Bank Conservation Act
concerning the grounds of appointment, by the Comptroller, of the FDIC as conservator
of a national bank).
68. See id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 282 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (adding new
§§ 5(s) and 5(t) to the Home Owners' Loan Act, imposing minimum capital standards for
savings associations, providing for the development and enforcement of these standards
by the Director of OTS, and stipulating that the standards should be at least equal to
those imposed on commercial banks).
69. In FIRREA, Congress imposed liability on "commonly-controlled depository in-
stitutions" for losses incurred by the FDIC in connection with the default of, or assist-
ance provided to, sister institutions, and granted the FDIC power to assess the amount of
compensation to be paid. Id. § 206(a)(7)(e), 103 Stat. at 201 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1815(e)) (adding to the FDI Act § 5(e)). This imposition of cross-liability on affiliate
institutions might perhaps be regarded as implicit recognition of the principle underlying
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of its controversial "source of strength" doctrine.70 The doctrine was
first upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate requirement for new
bank holding companies.71 The "source of strength" doctrine has been
used by the Fed in its attempt to impose upon bank holding companies
the continuing requirement that they provide financial support for their
ailing bank subsidiaries. Next Term the Supreme Court will resolve the
question of whether this is a legitimate exercise of the Fed's regulatory
powers;72 in the meantime, the doctrine has been deployed as a means of
enhancing the regulators' combined powers over the banking conglomer-
ates, providing a triggering mechanism for a chain of enforcement-re-
lated activity. 7 3
The 1989 reforms did not end the matter. Frustrated by the apparent
ineffectiveness of the regulators' newly-enhanced enforcement powers
when dealing with the more artful miscreants-so-called "S&L King-
pins" 7 4 - Congress enacted the Crime Control Act,7s which deals with,
among other things, the administrative enforcement powers of the federal
banking agencies. Title XXV of the Act is labeled the "Comprehensive
Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of
1990.,,76 This legislation is primarily concerned with increasing the
criminal penalties and disabilities attaching to financial-institution-re-
lated crimes and making provision for criminal and civil forfeiture; it
does, however, augment significantly the administrative enforcement
powers of the banking agencies as well.'
In the case of a failing bank, thrift or credit union, the Crime Control
Act permits the FDIC, conservators, the NCUAB and liquidating agents
the Fed's source of strength doctrine, although there is no indication in the legislative
history.
70. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1990) (Regulation Y); Policy Statement, 52 Fed. Reg.
15707 (1987).
71. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439
U.S. 234 (1978).
72. See MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of the Governors Fed. Res. Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 113-17.
74. The "kingpin" rhetoric was embraced by Congress in the Crime Control Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (to be codified at various sections of 18, 26 and
31 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Crime Control Act] which created a new financial crimes enter-
prise offense. See id. § 2510 ("Financial Crime Kingpin Statute")(to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 225).
75. Crime Control Act, supra note 74.
76. Subtitle H of Title XXV stands independently as the "Financial Institutions Anti-
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1990." For general preliminary analysis, see Buchman &
Douglas, The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery
Act of 1990, memorandum reprinted in Prentice Hall Law & Business, Current Develop-
ments in Banking Litigation 31 (1991) [hereinafter Current Developments]; Villa &
Krasne, A Preliminary Review of Banking Law Enforcement Provisions Contained in Title
XXV of the Crime Control Act of 1990, in Current Developments, supra, at 558.
77. For initial critical comment, see, e.g., Atinson, Bankers Worry About Effects of
Crime Bill, Am. Banker, Nov. 20, 1990, at 1; Glancz, Jordan & Metheson, New Bank
Fraud Law May Frighten Off the Competent, Am. Banker, Jan. 29, 1991, at 4.
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to apply to court for an order attaching the assets of any person desig-
nated by the respective agency, pending the resolution of the receivership
or conservatorship. 78 The banking agencies are also empowered to seek
prejudgment attachments to prevent the dissipation or removal of assets
final resolution of any unresolved enforcement action involving money
damages, restitution or civil money penalties. 79 The FDIC and NCUAB
are given the power to prohibit or limit, by regulation or order, any
golden parachute payment or indemnification agreement where the
agency believes that: the beneficiary has engaged in fraud, a breach of
trust or fiduciary duty; insider abuse has materially affected the deposi-
tory institution or holding company, is substantially responsible for caus-
ing the institution's insolvency, or has violated various federal or state
banking laws or regulations.80 Banking agencies are now required to re-
port their enforcement action publicly on a monthly basis, and are re-
quired to include consent agreements as well as final orders.81 The
Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") also is required to maintain a
special enforcement division to assist and advise the RTC "and other
agencies" in "pursuing cases, civil claims, and administrative enforce-
ment actions" under the RTC's jurisdiction.82
It is likely that Congress, either through further legislation or by
means of its oversight activities, will continue to mandate or encourage
vigorous enforcement efforts. In its report to the Congress on the reform
of the federal deposit insurance system, the General Accounting Office
concluded that delays in the institution of formal enforcement proceed-
ings have been partly responsible for the failure of some institutions that
could have been saved,83 and the report urges the adoption of legislation
mandating earlier, more formal intervention by the agencies. 84 This re-
port was followed up by another, based on a study of 72 troubled banks,
in which it is demonstrated that earlier, vigorous enforcement action
might well have saved some of the banks that failed.85 The latter GAO
report also strongly criticizes the Fed, FDIC, and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") in particular, for having actually
reduced the level of their enforcement activities during the period 1986-
1989.86
78. See Crime Control Act, supra note 74, § 2521(a), 104 Stat. at 4863 (to be codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d), 1878(b)(2)).
79. See id. § 2521(c)(1), 104 Stat. at 4865 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)).
80. See id. § 2523, 104 Stat. at 4868 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(k), 1786(t)).
81. See id. § 2547, 104 Stat. at 4886 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(u), 1786(s)).
82. Id. § 2540, 104 Stat. at 4884 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)).
83. See GAO, Strategy for Reform, supra note 66.
84. See id. at ch. 3 (proposing the institution of a "tripwire" system, in terms of which
graduated, and progressively more severe, enforcement responses on the part of the re-
sponsible supervising agency would be legislatively mandated according to the stages of a
bank's deterioration).
85. See General Accounting Office, Bank Supervision: Prompt and Forceful Regula-
tory Actions Needed (GAO/GCD-91-69) [hereinafter "Bank Supervision"].
86. Id. at 33-45; see also H.R. 1505 (Treasury-sponsored bill containing numerous
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The banking agencies seem to have got the message and have not hesi-
tated to use their new powers. Enforcement activity has sharply in-
creased, particularly at the OCC17 and the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS"); 8 the OTS issued a new capital directive immediately after the
passage of FIRREA 9 and substantially reorganized and strengthened its
enforcement operations;' the agencies have considerably increased the
size of the penalties they have sought against institutions and institution-
affiliated parties;91 under their expanded cease and desist powers, the
new enforcement provisions); S. 543, tit. II (Riegle bill); H.R. 6, tit. I (House Banking
Committee Bill); supra note 66; cf Comm. on Government Operations; The U.S Govern-
ment's War Against Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in Financial Institutions: Winning
Some Battles But Losing the War, H. Rep. 101-982, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (finding
that serious misconduct continues to plague the industry, that the enforcement efforts by
the Justice Department remain inadequate, and recommending, inter alia, that the bank-
ing agencies revise their procedures in order to ensure that "bad actors" are more effec-
tively screened out of the industry (Title VIII)).
87. The Comptroller of the Currency has announced the following substantial in-
creases in formal enforcement activities at the OCC:
OCC ENFORCEMENT ACrIONS AGAINST NATIONAL BANKs r-OR 1989 AND 1990
Type of Action Total 1989 Total 1990
Cease & Desist Orders 2 47
Removals 14 30
Civil Money Penalties 129 151
Formal Agreements 87 168
Source: B.A. Rehm, Despite Errors Clarke Says, Confirmation Not in Peril,
Am. Banker, June 11, 1991, at 1.
88. The following figures demonstrate the effect of FIRREA at the OTS:
OTS ENFORCEMENT AcTIONs AGAINST ALL THRIFT INSTITUTIONS FOR
1989 AND 1990
Type of Action Total 1989 Total 1990
Cease & Desist Orders 34 63
Removal, Prohibition & Suspension
Orders 47 78
Civil Money Penalties 0 26
Formal Agreements 267 347
Source: OTS Office of Congressional Relations & Communications
As the General Accounting Office found, the other agencies slightly reduced their for-
mal enforcement activities during 1986-1989. See GAO, Bank Supervision, supra note
85, at 35. The response of the regulators, however, has been a defensive one, indicating
that they will now take formal action whenever possible. See, eg., id Appendix Il, at 70(Comments from the OCC, stating that "OCC's 1990 report of enforcement actions...
showed a total of 842 formal and informal enforcement actions initiated in a single year.
... The GAO's report reflects that the OCC takes many more enforcement actions per
regulated bank than either the FDIC or the Federal Reserve Board.")
89. Office of Thrift Supervision, Capital Adequacy: Guidance on the Status of Capi-
tal and Accounting Forbearances and Capital Instruments Held by a Deposit Insurance
Fund, Thrift Bulletin No. 38-2 (Jan. 9, 1990) [hereinafter TB 38-2].
90. See OTS Fills Key Enforcement Positions: Shifts Enforcement Personnel, 56 Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) 357 (Feb. 25, 1991).
91. OTS was seeking the payment of $19.6 million by a former Texas thrift owner
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agencies have begun to seek restitution and reimbursement for losses suf-
fered by financial institutions;92 under the 1990 Act93 they have success-
fully secured court orders freezing the assets of directors and officers
pending agency enforcement proceedings; 94 and, in addition to their
criminal referrals to the Justice Department, the FDIC and RTC have
also pursued a number of large civil suits in the courts. 95 The enforce-
ment environment has, in short, radically changed during the past
decade.96
II. RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
As already observed, the courts have tended in the past to display a
under a capital maintenance agreement signed by the former owner before his institution
suffered severe losses. See Klinkerman, Thrift Office, Enforcing Capital Pact, Seeks $19.6
Million in Texas Case, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 1991, at 2. This report also cites former
OTS director of enforcement, Rosemary Stewart, as knowing of "up to five similar
proceedings."
92. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying note 74.
94. See, e.g., N.J. District Court Freezes Assets, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 528 (Mar. 18,
1991)(reporting that a New Jersey district court had placed restrictions on the assets of
the former president and five officers of Ambase Corp., the holding company for Carteret
Savings Bank of Morristown, New Jersey.); OTS Files Charges Against Ambase Corp.
Officers for Unsafe Thrift Practices, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 367 (Feb. 25, 1991)(discuss-
ing underlying agency proceedings in Ambase case).
95. Perhaps the most publicized examples concern the suits filed against the law firm
of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. The most recent suit is Resolution Trust Corp. v. Keat-
ing, Case No. CIV-89-1509 PHX-RMB (MDL Docket No. 834) (D. Ariz. Apr. 4,1991),
in which the firm is being sued for $50 million for having, inter alia, violated its fiduciary
duties and for having concealed and failed to disclose unsafe and unsound practices at
Lincoln Savings & Loan, "effectively prevent[ing] Lincoln from securing counsel to pro-
tect its own interests." RTC Charges Jones Day with Assisting Lincoln S&L in Deceiving
Regulators, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 654 (Apr. 8, 1991) (also describing other RTC suits
filed or in preparation). A suit filed earlier against Jones Day by the FDIC seeks $150
million damages for the firm's alleged negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty in repre-
senting Texas thrifts. See, e.g., Duke & Marcus, FDIC Sues Law Firm in Thrift Failures,
Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at B6, col. 5.
For some other recent cases, see FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1387 (Mar. 25, 1991); FSLIC v. Molinaro, 889 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.
1989); FDIC v. Dannen, 747 F. Supp. 1357 (W.D. Mo. 1990); FDIC v. Bernstein, 1990
W.L. 198738 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); FDIC v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 118 Bankr. 801
(Bkrtcy D.N.M. 1990); see also RTC, Office of Investigations Progress Report: September
30, 1990, at 3, reprinted in Current Developments, supra note 76, at 7 (discussing RTC
cases).
96. As a former chairman of the FDIC observed soon after the passage of FIRREA,
"[w]ith respect to supervision, thrifts clearly have some changes in store, and banks are
likely to see a new climate as well. For most of the past decade, supervision and enforce-
ment have grown increasingly formal and adversarial. That trend will likely continue, if
not accelerate." Isaac, Meet the New FDIC, A.B.A. Banking J. 47, 49 (Oct. 1989). For
an indication of the disposition of the agencies themselves, see, e.g., Daily Fine of $1
Million to Banks Making Insider Loans, FDIC Warns, 53 Banking Rep. (BNA) 628 (Oct.
30, 1989) (The FDIC Division of Bank Supervision Director has sent letters to state non-
member banks warning them that "examiners will monitor banks closely and will not




relatively high degree of deference toward administrative agencies as far
as the choice of sanctions and means of enforcement are concerned. 97
Judge Scalia's dictum in American Trucking Associations, Inc v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission 98 is representative of the general disposition
of the courts when reviewing agency enforcement activity:
in designing the most appropriate means to enforce the law, agency
discretion is at its zenith and judicial power at its nadir.99
And this deferential approach was applicable in the context of banking
agency enforcement,"°° as, indeed, the agencies themselves were well
aware. 101
Yet the doctrine of deference is not inscribed in stone: it reflects an
attitude rather than a principle of law. Indeed, one of the cases most
frequently cited in support of far-reaching, "hard look" judicial review,
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 102 is itself a case involving
the selection, by an agency, from among various options of a particular
sanction, which selection was held by the Court to constitute an improvi-
dent exercise of the agency's discretion. The agency, said Justice White,
should have disclosed the basis of its order, given a clear indication that
it had exercised the discretion entrusted to it by Congress, it should have
made findings supporting the decision, including findings "specifically di-
rected to the choice between two vastly different remedies with vastly
different consequences," and it should have articulated "a rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made." ' 3 Burlington
Truck Lines and other cases"° have explicitly or implicitly recognized
97. See generally W. Gellhorn, C. Byse, P. Strauss, T. Rakoff & R. Schotland, Ad-
ministrative Law: Cases and Comments 503-12 (8th ed. 1986) [hereinafter Administra-
tive Law]. As the authors point out, however, the actions of the courts when reviewing
agency enforcement action are unlikely to comport with the lore of deference: the courts,
growing more familiar with reviewing the more structured sentencing process mandated
by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, are likely to develop a more structured approach to
the review of agency enforcement actions. See id at 503-04. In addition, excessive sever-
ity (and possibly even excessive gentleness) in the imposition of sanctions is quite likely to
"fuel court intervention." Id at 508-11.
98. 697 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 1153 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm., 379
F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967) in which Judge Leventhal observed that "the breadth of
agency discretion is, if anything, at its zenith when the action assailed relates primarily
not to the issue of ascertaining whether conduct violates that statute, or regulations, but
rather to the fashioning of policies, remedies and sanctions, including enforcement and
voluntary compliance programs in order to arrive at maximum effectuation of Congres-
sional objectives."). Cf Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186-89
(1973).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
101. See, eg., In the matter of *** and ***, as the Board of Directors of*** (Insured
State Nonmember Bank), FDIC Enforcement Decisions and Orders 5014, at A-158
(1983) (P-H).
102. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
103. Id at 168.
104. See, eg., Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 613-614
(1946) (remanding cease and desist proceedings with instructions to the Commission to
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that, even at the enforcement end of agency action, an agency's discre-
tion is subject to judicial review according to the normal principles of
administrative law relating to abuse of discretion.
In fact, the courts have frequently displayed an inclination to apply
abuse-of-discretion standards to the enforcement actions of the federal
banking agencies. This can be observed across the full spectrum of en-
forcement and enforcement-related activity. I will focus on what seem to
me the four most important areas: first, and most generally, judicial re-
view of agency selection and application of individualized sanctions; sec-
ond, judicial review of agency enforcement of regulatory capital
standards; third, judicial review of the discretionary seizure, by the bank-
ing agencies, of depository institutions; and, fourth, judicial treatment of
potential tort liability on the part of the agencies for both the seizure and
operation of institutions.
A. Judicial Review of Agency Selection and Application of
Individualized Sanctions
Consonant with the low level of formal enforcement activity on the
part of the agencies themselves, few cases involving judicial review of
such activity were reported during the two decades that preceded the
development of the savings and loan and banking crises. With one fre-
quently-cited exception,105 those decisions that were reported also tended
to provide powerful precedents in favor of deference toward the
agencies. 'o6
From about 1980, however, there has been a steady (and over the past
two years, a sharp) increase in the number of reported decisions. 107
consider whether less drastic action would be sufficient); Administrative Law, supra note
93, at 507-11.
105. See Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1973). The court reversed an
order by the Comptroller prohibiting stockholder from further participation in the affairs
of a bank for clear departure from statutory authority.
106. See, eg., Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895
(5th Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Dept. of the Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir.
1978); Mid America Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 523 F.
Supp. 568, 577 (D. Minn. 1980). Cf First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d
1258, 1259 (5th Cir. 1980) (informal letter directives of Comptroller upheld as a "valid
exercise" of latter's wide discretion); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613
F. 2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Comptroller's rulemaking powers can be used in place
of cease-and-desist powers to prevent unsafe and unsound conduct); Continental Bank
and Trust Co. v. Martin, 303 F.2d 214, 216-19 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Fed's order to state bank
to increase its capitalization held not to be final, reviewable agency action); Miami Beach
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Callander, 256 F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (FHLBB can use
threat of more serious sanctions in order to pressure directors to resign).
107. See Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); Northwest Nat'l Bank
v. United States, 917 F.2d 1111 (8th Cir. 1990); Kronholm v. FDIC, 915 F.2d 1171 (8th
Cir. 1990); Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1990); Central Nat'l Bank of
Mattoon v. United States, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1990); First Nat'l Bank of Gordon v.
Department of the Treasury, 911 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1990); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972
(4th Cir. 1990); MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 U.S. 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991); Bullion v. FDIC, 881 F.2d
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
Again, this seems obviously to correlate with the increasing frequency of
formal agency action. Perhaps most important, however, is the fact that
the deference so often said to be accorded the agencies by the courts is
much more selectively observed in practice than the rhetoric would
suggest.10 8
1. The Predicate for Enforcement Action
The courts have usually respected the judgment, by a banking agency,
that the object of its enforcement action has committed a violation of a
law or regulation or, especially, that it has engaged in an unsafe or un-
sound practice. In the case of violations of law or regulation, the courts
have applied the principle of Chevron deference, in terms of which the
reasonable interpretation by an agency of an ambiguous statute must be
upheld by the reviewing court if the statute is one for which the agency
has primary administrative responsibility." 9 This form of deference ex-
isted in the arena of banking enforcement well before the Chevron case
itself was decided in 1984.1 °
In the case of unsafe and unsound practices, and where these practices
are not expressly identified in legislation, the courts have always recog-
nized that the concept of safety and soundness is a highly flexible one
best suited to expert discernment by the agency in the light of the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the enforcement proceedings.' So the basic
1368 (5th Cir. 1989); Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 879 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1989); Currie State Bank v. FDIC, 878 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1989); Stoddard v. Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 868 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Anaya v. FHLBB,
839 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1988); Abercrombie v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
833 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1987); Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244
(7th Cir. 1986); Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580 (1 lth Cir. 1986); Fitzpat-
rick v. FDIC, 765 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985); Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir.
1984); Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984); Citizens State Bank of
Marshfield, Missouri v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983); del Junco v. Conover, 682
F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259 (5th
Cir. 1981); Otero Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981); Bank St.
Croix v. FDIC, 755 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1991); Spiegel v. Ryan, 59 U.S.L.W. 2134
(C.D. Ca. 1990); [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1985); [Anonymous]
v. FDIC, 617 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1985); Somerfield v. FDIC, 609 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.
Tenn. 1985); First Nat'l Bank of Scotia v. United States, 530 F. Supp. 162 (D.D.C. Cir.
1982).
108. Cf Malloy, 1990 Supp., supra note 51, § 3.3.2, at 141-49 (discussing the "mixed"
results "[d]espite the generally wide judicial deference accorded the regulators in enforce-
ment actions").
109. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
110. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 100-02. For subsequent cases expressly
applying Chevron, see Abercrombie, 920 F.2d at 1357; First National Bank of Gordon, 911
F.2d at 64; Saratoga Sav. & Loan, 879 F.2d at 691; Anaya, 839 F.2d at 1351.
111. See, e.g., Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d
1127, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Whether a financial institution is in an unsafe or un-
sound condition is largely a predictive judgment (i.e., what may happen if this practice
continues), and reviewing courts should be particularly deferential when they are review-
ing an agency's predictive judgments, especially those within the agency's field of discre-
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question as to whether there ought to be liability for some kind of sanc-
tion has generally been entrusted to the final judgment of the agency
concerned. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that, at least in the
past, formal enforcement action has always followed only after a fairly
lengthy series of informal interactions between the agency and the depos-
itory institution or institution-related party: it is unlikely that the object
of enforcement will have been unaware of the fact that the activity form-
ing the predicate for enforcement action was disapproved by the agency.
Yet even with the safety and soundness concerns underlying the deci-
sion to impose sanctions, there have been exceptions. Two major rebuffs
to the banking agencies provide illustrations; both deal with attempts by
the agencies to enforce the strengthening and maintenance of capital
levels at ailing institutions, and both occurred in the Fifth Circuit.
The first case was First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency.112 The Comptroller had issued a complex cease-and-desist or-
der requiring, among other things, the bank to raise its equity capital to a
certain level within 180 days and to maintain that level thereafter.' 13
Although the court upheld the Comptroller's findings and orders with
respect to most of the other violations, 4 it ruled that the Comptroller's
finding that the banks' existing capital level was unsafe and unsound was
not supported by substantial evidence, even though the court fully recog-
nized that it should defer to the reasonable conclusions of the Comptrol-
ler. In the court's view, there was no rational connection between the
existing capital level being maintained by the bank and the Comptroller's
conclusion that this constituted an unsafe and unsound practice." 5 The
Bellaire decision was effectively overruled by Congress soon afterwards
when Congress conferred on the regulators the express power to set gen-
eral and specific capital requirements and to treat as inadequate the fail-
ure to maintain adequate capital levels as an unsafe and unsound
tion and expertise"); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697
F.2d 674, 688-89 (5th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Lamarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258,
1265 (5th Cir. 1980); Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164,
1168-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); Groos Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller
of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1978).
The courts have also recognized that "unsafe and unsound," in the banking context, is
a concept that is not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245, 250 (1947) (this and other concepts are "regulatory. They do not deal with unprece-
dented economic problems of varied industries. They deal with a single type of enterprise
and with the problems of insecurity and mismanagement which are as old as banking
enterprise."); Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W.2d 734, 741 (Iowa 1988) (reliance
on such terms is not tantamount to proceeding without standards or acting upon the basis
of "secret law"). Whether the assumptions upon which these decisions are based are still
valid will be considered later. See infra text accompanying notes 207-12.
112. 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Id. at 679 n.3.
114. See id. 681-83, 687. The court also ruled against the Comptroller with respect to
an alleged violation, concerning one of the bank's borrowers, of the loans-to-one-person
lending limit contained in 12 U.S.C. § 84. See id. at 683-84.




The second rebuff, also in the Fifth Circuit, came in the well-publi-
cized MCorp case," 7 in which the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that the
Fed had no authority to treat the failure by a holding company to pro-
vide financial support to its banking subsidiaries as an unsafe and un-
sound banking practice justifying the imposition of sanctions."' In fact,
the panel went so far as to rule that the Fed's long-standing "source of
strength doctrine""' 9 constituted a "clear departure from statutory au-
thority" and the action of the Board was therefore not subject to the
protection of the statutory preclusionary clause preventing judicial re-
view.1" The final outcome of this case awaits determination by the
Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari to this specific question. 1 '
MCorp and Bellaire are not the only examples, however, of judicial
intervention to strike down the determination by a banking agency that
the predicate for enforcement action has occurred. 122
2. The Selection of a Sanction
When it comes to the selection by the agency of the kind of sanction or
enforcement action to be applied, the courts have proved to be even less
reticent. In this context, too, the courts have often recognized that agen-
cies are entitled to great deference in the exercise of discretion in shaping
116. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97
Stat. 1280, 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1983); see also infra note 134.
117. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 11 S. CL 1101 (Mar. 4, 1991).
118. See id at 859-62.
119. Id See also supra text accompanying notes 69-73. According to one report, the
source of strength doctrine "had been part of the Fed's regulatory arsenal for more than
30 years." Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Review a Fed Policy on Banks, N.Y. Tunes,
Mar. 15, 1991.
120. See MCorp, 900 F.2d at 857 (applying the exception recognized by the Supreme
Court in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958)). The preclusionary clause in question is
contained in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i).
121. For a review of some of the conflicting policy concerns raised by the source-of-
strength doctrine in the MCorp context, see Vartanian, When Subsidiaries Stumble Par-
ents Face Tough Choices, Am. Banker, Sep. 12, 1990.
122. See, e.g., Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 879 F.2d 689, 695-96 (9th Cir.
1989) (Board's cease & desist order reversed because Board's regulation governing acqui-
sition, development and construction loans did not apply to acquisition and development
loans); First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 683-84
(5th Cir. 1983) (Comptroller had incorrectly concluded that the object of a cease and
desist order was not protected by a statutory exception); Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of
Jefferson Parish v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S.
1121 (1982) (FHLBB could not treat the S&L's method of charging interest, which devi-
ated from its advertised rate but which conformed to accepted practice, as an unsafe or
unsound practice violating consumer interests and serving as a basis for enforcement ac-
tion against the S&L); Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1973) (Comptroller could
not use fact that M had pled guilty to a charge of making a false statement to the Small
Business Administration as the basis for prohibiting M from further participation in the
conduct of the affairs of a bank).
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an appropriate remedy, 123 but this has not rendered judicial review a
futile exercise for those who have had enforcement orders entered against
them. On the contrary, there are numerous examples where litigants
have been successful in securing rulings to the effect that particular sanc-
tions applied by the agencies were either not permitted by statute or were
inappropriate or disproportionate in view of the underlying violations.
a. Sanctions Unauthorized by Statute
In the first place, the courts have usually adopted a strict approach to
the question of whether the actual sanction or remedy selected by the
agency has a statutory basis at all. An example is Otero Savings and
Loan Association v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board.124 The FHLBB
had correctly determined that Otero had been offering automatic transfer
system ("ATS") and negotiable order of withdrawal ("NOW") accounts
in violation of the statutory prohibitions then in force. Because the ac-
counts had become legal by the time the Board had determined the viola-
tion, the Board decided to impose an "equitable" order, in terms of
which Otero was prevented from opening any new such accounts for a
period of 268 days following the effective date of the order. This remedy
was designed to redress the fact that Otero had gained a 268 day compet-
itive advantage over other institutions by offering such accounts before
being permitted to do so. Although the Tenth Circuit panel agreed that
the accounts had been prohibited,' 25 a majority of the panel refused to
defer to the Board regarding the "equitable" sanction, finding that the
Board lacked such remedial powers.'2 6
More recently, and prior to the general extension by FIRREA of the
123.
[E]ven if we were inclined to agree that the Comptroller was being excessively
severe. . ., we would not be justified in setting aside his order. The general
posture of a court reviewing agency decisions is deferential; how deferential de-
pends among other things on the nature of the issue. The more open-ended it is,
and hence judgmental, and the more a sound exercise of judgment requires a
specialized knowledge possibly possessed by the agency but certainly not by the
court, the lighter the judicial hand. Here... the choice of sanctions is judg-
mental-an exercise of administrative discretion entitled to judicial respect
•.. - and depends on particulars of the banking industry to which the general-
ist federal judiciary is not privy.
Central Nat'l Bank of Mattoon v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 904
(7th Cir. 1990)(Posner J.); see also Brickner v. FDIC, 747 F.2d 1198, 1203 (8th Cir. 1984)
("'Administrative agencies have considerable latitude to shape their remedies within the
scope of their statutory authority.' Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
640 F.2d 1322, 1326 .... The relation of remedy to statutory policy is peculiarly a
matter for the special competence of the administrative agency. See American Power Co.
v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90... (1946). Thus, an agency's choice of remedies is generally not to
be overturned unless the reviewing court finds that it is unwarranted in law or without
justification in fact." (citations omitted).
124. 665 F.2d 279 (10th Cir. 1981).
125. See id. at 281-83.
126. See id. at 286-89, 291-92. The dissent argued that the court should defer to the
Board. See id. at 293.
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agencies' enforcement powers, panels in the Seventh, Eighth and District
of Columbia Circuits refused to defer to the Comptroller, the FDIC and
the Fed, respectively, where these agencies had attempted to adapt their
cease and desist powers to give effect to "equitable"-type reimbursement
orders127 or to extend sanctions to individuals who had already resigned
their positions in the depository institutions concerned.1 28 The confusion
resulting from these decisions, which stood in contrast to those of other
courts and which highlighted the inconsistencies between the enforce-
ment powers of the various agencies, 29 was addressed by Congress in
FIRREA, which expressly granted to the agencies the powers they had
claimed in the earlier litigation,130 but it would be sanguine to assume
that disputes concerning the validity of these powers are completely
over."' In any event, even with their extended statutory authority, the
agencies have still to pass muster under the rationality review, to which
we now turn.
b. Inappropriate or Disproportionate Sanctions
Even where it is clear that the particular kind of sanction imposed by
the agency was one within the bounds of the agency's general discretion-
127. See, eg., Larimore v. Comptroller of the Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1255-56 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Comptroller had no authority under his cease and desist powers to require
directors personally to compensate bank for losses caused by approval of excessive loans);
Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 216-219 (8th Cir. 1984) (FDIC lacked power
to order reimbursement to consumers by bank for overcharges arising from technical
Truth in Lending violations).
128. See Stoddard v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 868 F.2d 1308, 1310-12
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (Board lacked jurisdiction to order removal of Stoddard from director-
ship and office, or to impose further prohibitions upon him, because Stoddard had al-
ready resigned his positions before the removal proceedings had been instituted).
129. Other circuits and panels had affirmed similar claims by other banking agencies.
See Hoffman v. FDIC, 912 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1990); Anaya v. FHLBB, 839
F.2d 1349, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987); Sunshine State Bank v. FDIC, 783 F.2d 1580, 1581-84(11th Cir. 1986); del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1146 (1983); First Natl Bank v. Dept. of Treasury, 568 F.2d 610, 611 (8th Cir.
1978).
130. See FIRREA, §§ 902, 103 Stat. at 450 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b),
1786(e)). FIRREA grants to the agencies express authority to include orders of restitu-
tion and reimbursement as part of cease and desist orders. Id. § 905, 103 Stat. at 459 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(i), 1786(k))(thereby permitting removal and prohibition
orders to be made, for a period of six years, against persons who have already severed
their connection with the depository institutions in question). For commentary, see Re-
port of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, supra note 49, at 467-68
(discussing the Larimore decision); Id. at 468-69 (discussing the Stoddard decision).
131. In Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984), the court expressed
misgivings about the constitutional validity under Article III of any statutory authoriza-
tion to the agency which might permit it to order that the bank reimburse consumers for
overcharges. Id. at 219. Because the banking industry is so closely regulated, however,
and because there remains the protection of judicial review, it is likely that the power of
the banking agencies, as part of an enforcement action, to adjudicate liability between
institutions and their affiliated parties would not violate Article III. See Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985); see also Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834 (1986).
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ary powers, the courts have not always accepted that the sanctions were
appropriately applied to the cases at hand. In some proceedings, for ex-
ample, courts have remanded the proceedings to the agencies after engag-
ing in the most exacting, "hard look" review in ways that have been fully
consistent with the most rigorous standards of review applicable else-
where in administrative law. 132
There have also been rulings declaring the scope of the remedy inap-
propriately broad, given the inadequacy of the agency's explanation or
underlying findings, 133 or because of the temporary nature of the pro-
ceedings.' 34 And even though the courts have been willing to accept the
imposition of fairly severe sanctions,1 35 they have sometimes found civil
penalties to be improperly determined because of a failure to take into
account all relevant considerations.' 36
B. Judicial Review of Agency Enforcement of
Regulatory Capital Standards
The courts have even been remarkably interventionist, though so far
only at the district court level, in one highly controversial area of en-
forcement activity: namely, the enforcement by the OTS of the new capi-
tal maintenance and accounting standards imposed by Congress in
132. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971); see, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8th Cir. 1983)
(articulating hard look review and citing the standard precedents for such review, Motor
Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 31 (1983); see also
First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 680-81 (5th
Cir. 1983) (using similar, hard look language); [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 617 F. Supp. 509,
514 (D.D.C. 1985) (also citing State Farm for principles of judicial review of discretion-
ary agency action).
133. See, eg., [Anonymous] v. FDIC, 619 F. Supp. 866, 866 (D.D.C. 1985) (prelimi-
nary injunction granted; inadequate justification supplied by the agency for imposing an
industrywide prohibition or suspension from current employment).
134. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Ryan, 59 U.S.L.W. 2134, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 306 (C.D.
Cal. 1990) (temporary cease & desist power an inappropriate vehicle for making an order
requiring correction of past actions). The Crime Control Act of 1990, § 2596(b), over-
ruled the effects of this decision by permitting the banking agencies to include orders for
affirmative relief within the scope of temporary cease and desist orders. For an example
of a case, in which the exercise of the new temporary cease and desist powers have been
upheld, see Bank St. Croix v. FDIC, 755 F. Supp. 455 (D.D.C. 1991).
135. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1352 (7th Cir. 1990)(assessment
of moderately severe penalties affirmed); Central Nat'l Bank v. United States Dept. of the
Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 903-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (Comptroller's revocation of bank's trust
powers, though severe, held not to be disproportionate to wrong committed).
136. See, e.g., Bullion v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 1368, 1370 (5th Cir. 1989) (partial reversal
and remand for redetermination of penalty assessed against one party because of failure
by agency to take into account party's ability to pay). Cf Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972,
973 (4th Cir. 1990) (remand to trial court for reassessment of agency's imposition of civil
penalties because of possible failure by trial court to appreciate that Change in Bank




FIRREA on S&Ls.13 7 Because the cases involved have generated a juris-
prudence and controversy of their own, they will be treated as a separate
issue in this paper. But a connection between them and the cases already
discussed should not be overlooked. To the extent that the agencies are
expressly authorized to take enforcement action against, including even
seizure of, an institution by reason of its failure to maintain required cap-
ital standards, 3 ' the power to impose such standards by the Director of
OTS (DOTS)-even in the face of agreements to the contrary between
the OTS's predecessor and the thrift concerned--constitutes an ex-
tremely far-reaching weapon in the regulator's bag of supervisory
instruments.
Disputes concerning the exercise of this power have revolved around
four main issues. First, has Congress effected a taking by requiring those
thrifts that had secured forbearance agreements to write down their regu-
latory goodwill over a period shorter than that provided for in the agree-
ments? If so, it might follow that, while the DOTS is authorized to
enforce the write down, the United States would be liable for compensa-
tion under the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, the FDIC might
be liable to make restitution to the investors of the seized institution for
the amount by which the institution's value had been enhanced as a re-
sult of their contributions made in reliance on a forbearance agree-
ment.13 9 Second, and in the alternative, did Congress intend to preserve
the rights of those thrifts that had secured forbearance agreements, such
that the OTS, as successor to the FHLBB, is contractually bound by the
agreements? Third, if breaches of the agreements by the agency have
taken place, can declaratory and injunctive relief be secured in the federal
district courts, or does the principle of sovereign immunity require that a
suit for damages be brought in the United States Claims Court? Finally,
can the refusal by the DOTS to grant a discretionary exemption from the
application of the capital standards be subjected to ordinary APA-type
judicial review for abuse of discretion?
In addressing these issues in various procedural formats, the decisions
137. See generally, Note, Abrogation of Forbearance Agreements Unauthorized by
FIRREA and Unconstitutional, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 157 (1990).
138. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(s)(3), (t)(6)(E), (t)(7)(E) (1988) (providing that failure to
maintain adequate capital may be treated by the DOTS as an unsafe and unsound prac-
tice); id. § 3907(b)(1) (International Lending Supervision Act of 1983). The connection
between capital standards and enforcement is underlined by the fact that this provision of
the International Lending Supervision Act was enacted in response to the decision in
First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983),
which had struck down that portion of the Comptroller's cease and desist order that had
required the bank to maintain a specific level of capital as being unsupported by substan-
tial evidence. The Act expressly permitted the agencies to treat the failure to maintain
adequate capital standards as an unsafe and unsound practice. See Cobb, Supplement,
supra note 23, S2-23-S2-25; Huber, supra note 21, at 147-48.
139. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(affirming jurisdiction of district court to consider claim for restitution as a cause of ac-
tion independent from a takings claim).
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at the district court level have gone in every direction and (perhaps in
reaction against perceived regulatory overkill 14°) usually against the
OTS. One court has dismissed a thrift's takings and estoppel claims be-
cause it found no waiver of sovereign immunity, 4 ' but other courts have
granted preliminary relief either because they have found the rights cre-
ated by the forbearance agreements to have been protected by FIRREA
itself, or because the DOTS' implementation of the capital standards
under FIRREA has been inflexible and therefore unreasonable. 142 After
a full trial, another court concluded that FIRREA did not abrogate a
conversion and forbearance agreement entered into between the FHLBB
and an ailing thrift, and that the repudiation by DOTS of the conversion
agreement constituted an unconstitutional taking.1 43 The Claims Court
has found in one case that the government intended to enter into a bind-
ing contract, but the question of liability is still pending. 144
On the other hand, the circuits that have ruled so far on the merits
145
have both found in favor of the government, although not without en-
tirely eliminating the confusion surrounding the disputes.1 46 First, in
Franklin Federal Savings Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision,147
the Sixth Circuit (in a 2-1 decision) concluded that Congress did intend
in FIRREA to abrogate the forbearance agreements,1 48 that the DOTS is
140. Cf Wayne, Bank Regulators: Too Much Zeal?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at C2,
col. 1.
141. Olympic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 1990 WL 134841
(D.D.C. 1990). But the court held that it had jurisdiction over the thrift's administrative
law claims. Id. at * 10.
142. See Carteret Say. Bank v. OTS, 762 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1991); Hansen Say.
Bank v. OTS, 758 F. Supp. 240 (D.N.J. 1991). Rodriguez J. noted that "[iun this case,
there is no evidence of mismanagement. [Hansen Savings) did not receive gratuitous
forbearances. Plaintiffs contributed substantial assets and agreed to absorb a failing
thrift's losses in order to help relieve the government of its insurance obligation." Id. at
247.
143. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1044 (D. Or.
1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint, seek-
ing rescission of the forbearance agreement and restitution for the amount by which the
FSLIC Resolution Fund was enriched as a result of the agreement, was not tried because
the Federal Circuit had granted a stay pending determination of whether, on this issue,
the district court had jurisdiction instead of the Claims Court. The Federal Circuit has
now affirmed the jurisdiction of the district court and dissolved the stay. See id.
144. See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (U.S. C!. Ct. 1990). The
Claims Court has recently rejected the takings claim by American Continental Corpora-
tion with respect to the seizure of Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, but this case
did not involve the regulatory capital and forbearance issues. See American Continental
Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
145. See, e.g., Far West Fed. Bank. v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (affirming jurisdiction of district court to determine claim seeking rescission of
forbearance agreement and restitution from relevant government fund); First Fed. Say.
Bank v. Ryan, 927 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining to reach the merits and holding
that OTS had not yet taken final action that would be ripe for review).
146. Other appeals are still pending. See 3(7) Bank/Thrift Lit. & Enf. News 4-5 (2/
18/91).
147. 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1991).
148. See id. at 1334, 1337.
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authorized to disregard the limitations contained in the forbearance
agreements, but that this would constitute a taking for which compensa-
tion would have to be paid. 4 9
The Eleventh Circuit has also ruled in favor of the OTS, reversing the
decision of the district court in Guaranty Financial Services to grant a
preliminary injunction against the OTS.'1 The district court had found
there was substantial likelihood on the merits of the plaintiff's claim that
it had a binding agreement with the OTS concerning supervisory good-
will, and that the rights, duties and obligations thereunder had been pro-
tected by FIRREA.' 51 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, while
accepting that the agreement between the FHLBB and the thrift consti-
tuted a contract, construed the contract as a conditional one. The agree-
ment had defined regulatory capital and regulatory capital requirements
in accordance with federal regulations including "any successor regula-
tion," and the agreement explicitly recognized that all regulations to
which it referred might be amended." 2 The Court ruled that the con-
tract therefore anticipated changes, including the tightening of capital
requirements.' 53 In reaching this result, the court applied a well-estab-
lished canon of construction in terms of which "one who wishes to obtain
a contractual right against the sovereign that is immune from the effect
of future changes in law must make sure that the contract confers such a
right in unmistakable terms.""
Having concluded that the agreement between Guaranty Financial
and the FHLBB did indeed reserve to the Congress and the agencies the
right to change the regulatory standards,' the court went on to consider
whether Congress, in FIRREA, had intended to preserve Guaranty Fi-
nancial's existing rights under the agreement. Like the Sixth Circuit,'56
the Eleventh Circuit concluded, after an extensive review of the legisla-
tive history, that Congress did indeed intend to abrogate the regulatory
capital standards contained in agreements such as the one entered into
between Guaranty Financial and the FHLBB.'5 7 Hence Guaranty Fi-
nancial's rights under the contract had changed as a result of FIRREA.
149. Id. at 1341.
150. Guaranty Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1991), reversing 742 F.
Supp. 1159 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
151. See id. at 995.
152. Id. at 999.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1001 (quoting Western Fuels-Utah v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990)). The court also emphasized the Supreme Court's ad-
monition, as expressed in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrap-
ment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), "that contracts should be construed, if possible, to avoid
foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority." Id. at 52-53.
155. The agency could hardly have contracted to prevent Congress from exercising the
power to change the regulatory system: at most, this exercise of Congress' police power
might give rise to a claim for compensation under the Takings Clause.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
157. Guaranty Financial, 928 F.2d at 994.
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The court's approach in Guaranty Financial would not entirely elimi-
nate the possibility of a successful claim against the government where
the terms of the agreement were sufficiently clear. Turning as it does on
the specific terms of the contract itself, Guaranty Financial does not set-
tle the question of whether agreements that did not contemplate a change
in the specific capital requirements of the thrift concerned should be re-
garded as binding, FIRREA notwithstanding. But the conclusion of
both the Sixth and Eleventh circuits that Congress clearly intended to
abrogate the capital forbearances contained in the agreements entered
into between the FHLBB and thrifts prior to the enactment of FIRREA
suggests that the disputes concerning those thrifts which can establish
clear and binding agreements will now turn into disputes concerning just
compensation, and that injunctive relief from the courts, at least where
this interpretation of FIRREA is followed, is likely to be foreclosed.
Because of the uncertainty as to whether the Sixth and Eleventh cir-
cuits' interpretation is correct, a most important decision is pending ap-
peal in Far West Federal in the Ninth Circuit. The district court, after a
full bench trial, had granted injunctive and declaratory relief on the basis
that a conversion agreement between the FHLBB and the plaintiff was
binding on the government, that the agreement had not been abrogated
by FIRREA, and that the repudiation of the agreement by the OTS con-
stituted an unconstitutional taking.158
Although the OTS is claiming victory in the wake of its successes in
the Franklin Federal and Guaranty Financial cases, the claim seems pre-
mature given the variety of views, both in the circuit panels and in the
district courts, and given the unresolved takings issue. It seems inevita-
ble that the dispute will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
C. Judicial Review of Discretionary Seizures
The most drastic action a banking agency can take is to seize the insti-
tution and place it in conservatorship or receivership. This is not only
the most far-reaching enforcement power possessed by the agencies, it is
also the one which the courts have long been most loath to burden with
due process requirements beyond those provided for by Congress."5 9 It
is, moreover, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish that the
158. See Far West Fed. Bank v. Director of the OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042, 1042 (D. Or.
1990). The district court denied an OTS motion to sever one of the counts and transfer it
to the U.S. Claims Court. The Federal Circuit granted a temporary stay pending appeal
but on appeal then affirmed the district court and lifted the stay. See Far West Fed. Bank
v. Director of the OTS, 930 F.2d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
159. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Haralson v. FHLBB, 655 F. Supp. 1550
(D.D.C. 1987); Farmers State Bank v. Bernau, 433 N.W. 2d 734 (Iowa 1988). Cf. FDIC
v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (need for prompt governmental action also justifies sum-
mary removal of director from office long prior to full administrative hearing and final




seizure would constitute a taking for the purpose of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause.1" Furthermore, even though Congress may have implied a
broader standard when it directed district courts to determine "upon the
merits" whether the appointment was sustainable,1 61 many courts have
indicated that they will apply the normal arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard when reviewing challenges to the appointment of conservators or
receivers." Finally, the courts have refused to grant injunctive relief to
ward off the regulators before seizure takes place; instead, the statutory
remedy of post-seizure challenge has been held to be exclusive. 63
In 1990, the OTS won a major victory when the seizure of Lincoln
Savings and Loan by its predecessor, the FHLBB, went to trial before
Judge Stanley Sporkin in the District Court of the District of Colum-
bia.' Many of the facts surrounding Lincoln are well known: Charles
Keating, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lincoln's holding
company, American Continental Corporation ("ACC"), was a focal fig-
ure in the inquiry into the ethical conduct of the "Keating Five" sena-
tors, that led to a recommendation for the censure of Senator Alan
Cranston.
The FHLBB placed Lincoln in conservatorship in April 1989, and the
following August, the Board converted the conservatorship into a receiv-
ership. The Board determined that Lincoln was "in an unsafe and un-
sound condition to transact business" and that there had been a
substantial dissipation of Lincoln's assets as a result of regulatory viola-
tions and unsafe and unsound practices.' 65  Among the numerous rea-
sons for the Board's action were certain arrangements between ACC and
Lincoln, including a "tax sharing agreement," under the terms of which
160. See American Continental Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 692 (1991).
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (national banks); id. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (formerly
1464(d)(6)(A), S&Ls); id. § 1821(c)(7) (state insured banks; appointment by FDIC).
162. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127,
1141-42 (10th Cir. 1991); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400, 1406-09 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d
1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1986); Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 904-05
(D.D.C. 1990); San Marino Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. 502, 508 (C.D.
Ca. 1984); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343, 350, 353-
54 (N.D. Ohio 1981). But cf. Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 742 F. Supp.
1089, 1095-99 (D. Kan. 1990) (indicating that a somewhat wide, "hybrid," scope of re-
view than that contemplated by the APA-type "arbitrary and capricious" review is con-
templated), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); Haralson v. FHLBB, 655 F. Supp.
1550, 1557-60 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1149-52
(N.D. Ill. 1986)(same); Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 869-70
(N.D. MI1. 1981) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 992 (1983); Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (N.D.
Ca. 1982) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 914 (1983).
163. See American Bank v. Clarke, 933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991); Shemoasky v. OTS,
733 F. Supp. 892, 895 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
164. Lincoln Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990).
165. See Lincoln Savings, 743 F. Supp. at 903 (quoting the statutory grounds for ap-
pointment of a conservator or receiver).
1991] S221
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Lincoln was required to remit to ACC the amounts of tax it would osten-
sibly owe on the basis of its net profits. ACC would then merge this tax
liability with its own, on a consolidated basis, and, because ACC had
large stored-up operating losses, ACC was able keep the amounts re-
ceived from Lincoln. In other words, the arrangement created a means
whereby ACC was able to "upstream" $94 million from Lincoln, thereby
dissipating Lincoln's assets to the detriment of Lincoln's own safety and
soundness and, of course, at great cost to the federal deposit insurance
fund.1
66
Judge Sporkin found the upstreaming agreement and many other prac-
tices fully proved by the FHLBB's successor, the OTS, and he found that
they amply justified the Board's seizure of Lincoln. The regulator's ac-
tion survived scrutiny not only under the arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard that Judge Sporkin determined was applicable to reviews of thrift
seizures, but also under "each of the other standards that are utilized to
review an agency action."' 67 In addition to excoriating ACC, Lincoln,
and its directors and officers, Judge Sporkin also added a special post-
script in which he raised concerns about the conduct of the lawyers and
accountants, particularly with regard to their failure to disassociate
themselves from the obviously improper transactions between ACC, Lin-
coln, and others. Moreover, he seemed to provide strong encouragement
to the bank regulators to intensify their enforcement action against "in-
stitution-affiliated" professionals. 61 Certainly, this is how his observa-
tions were received by the regulators, particularly the OTS, 169 which had
166. See id. at 908-911.
167. Id. at 905. Presumably Judge Sporkin meant to include by this phrase both the
"substantial evidence" standard (see id. at 919) and, because he had considered whether
the statutory phrase "upon the merits" might suggest review de novo, de novo review as
well. His analysis of the evidence upon which the Board's action was said to be based
certainly seems to support this interpretation.
168. See id. at 919-21.
169. Soon after Judge Sporkin's decision, officials at the OTS and RTC indicated their
intention to take strong enforcement action against attorneys and other professionals.
See, e.g., Duke & Noah, Thrift Agency is to Sue Some Attorneys, Others in Wake of Lin-
coln S&L Decision, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1990, at B6, col. 4; Knight, S&L Regulators Vow
to Hold Professionals Responsible, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1990, at Dl , ol. 1. See also
McCoy, Schmitt & Bailey, Hall of Shame: Besides S&L Owners, Host of Professionals
Paved Way for Crisis, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1990, at A4, col. I (reporting on the role of
professionals in the S&L "catastrophe"). Two weeks later it was reported that the OTS
was planning to clamp down on accountants and lawyers who had advised abusive thrift
managements. See Zuckerman, Thrift Office Planning Penalties Against Accountants, At-
torneys, Am. Banker, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1. Five days later the OTS recirculated another
story confirming the same trend. See Knight, S&L Crisis Breeds Tough Group of Regula-
tory Enforcers, Wash. Post., Nov. 19, 1990, at A2. On the same day a similar article,
reporting the increased likelihood of enforcement against directors and officers, was pub-
lished. See Welling, Directors and Officers Face Greater Risk of Liability, Am. Banker,
Nov. 19, 1990, at 4.
See generally Villa, Accountants, Lawyers Face an Enforcement Threat, Am. Banker,
April 10, 1991, at 4. Cf also Duke, OT Is trying to Regulate the Accounting Profession,
Thrift Regulator, Dec. 14, 1990; Tolchin, Accounting Firm's Pact On S.&L. 's, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1990, at D7, col. 6 (reporting on a cease and desist agreement reached
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hailed the Lincoln decision as a major victory.' 70
The OTS' Lincoln victory was followed in 1991 by another in the
Tenth Circuit. In Franklin Savings Association v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,171 a unanimous panel reversed the district court hold-
ing that the Director of OTS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
appointing a conservator, "not for the purpose of liquidation," but only
to prevent further deterioration in Franklin's condition. In the panel's
view, the record amply supported the Director's decision to appoint the
conservator and the trial judge had failed to accord sufficient deference to
the Director's findings concerning Franklin's safety and soundness. The
appeals court did emphasize that the case did "not involve the more se-
vere decision to appoint a conservator for the purpose of liquidation."'"
Nevertheless, the opinion is thoroughly reasoned and constitutes, in this
author's opinion, a correct exposition of the principles of administrative
law applicable to reviewing the appointment of both conservators and
receivers. 173
Yet even against this background of strong judicial support for the
seizure and broadened enforcement powers of the banking agencies, a
series of recent decisions have gone against the regulators. These include
one that was reached after a full bench trial, 74 two that were decided on
motions for summary judgment, 175 and one that was decided on a motion
to dismiss. 176
In the case that went to trial, Franklin Savings Association v. Director
of the Office of Thrift Supervision," the OTS appointed a conservator for
Franklin. The S&L challenged this appointment and, after an eighteen-
day trial, Judge Saffels found that the OTS and its agents had drawn
arbitrary conclusions and had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in nu-
merous respects concerning the treatment of Franklin's assets and liabili-
between the accountants and oTs, about which the Director of OTS, T. Timothy Ryan,
was quoted as saying: "This is a significant case .... It says loud and clear that we hold
accountants, lawyers and other professionals accountable for their actions, just as we do
S.&.L. directors and officers.").
170. See Judge Sporkin Upholds FHLBB Takeover of Keating's Lincoln Savings and
Loan, 55 Banking Report (BNA) 344, 345-46 (Aug. 27, 1990).
171. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
172. d at 1141.
173. The OTS also secured a minor victory in the Fourth Circuit on a collateral appeal
in which the Fourth Circuit reversed a district judge's ruling that the former Director of
OTS, M. Danny Wall, could be deposed concerning his mental processes in reaching the
decision to appoint a conservator. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209 (4th
Cir. 1991) (applying the well-established Morgan principle that such questions, absent
extraordinary circumstances, are clearly improper. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409 (1941)).
174. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the 01S, 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan.
1990).
175. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Texas Am.
Bancshares v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1254 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
176. See Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of the First Republicbank Corp. v.
FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
177. 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
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ties. Taking the view that this was "not a case involving an infamous or
notorious savings and loan association" or one "involving fraud, corrup-
tion, or self-dealing by the management or directors," the judge reached
the conclusion that "[e]ssentially, this case boils down to a dispute over
accounting practices.""" 8 OTS' action, Judge Saffels opined, was most
likely "motivated by the disturbing events that had occurred earlier with
regard to Silverado Savings and Loan in Colorado and... [OTS/To-
peka's] difficulty with Franklin's unique and innovative operations." 17 9
Among the many grounds for the OTS's action was the relationship be-
tween Franklin Savings and its parent company, Franklin Savings Cor-
poration ("FSC"): like Lincoln Savings and American Continental
Corporation,8 ° Franklin Savings and FSC had mutual tax agreements;
unlike the case in Lincoln Savings, however, the agreements had long
been known to the FHLBB and OTS, had been acquiesced in by them,
and were not designed to upstream funds from the thrift to its parent.
The court ruled that OTS' treatment of the agreements as raising concern
about the safety and soundness of Franklin Savings was arbitrary and
capricious."1 The court ordered the OTS to remove its conservator.18 2
The remaining cases were in the Northern District of Texas, although
each was adjudicated by a different judge. All involved the seizure of
bank subsidiaries of large holding companies: in the Senior Unsecured
Creditors' case,"8 3 the holding corporation was First RepublicBank Cor-
poration, the rescue of whose flagship bank by the FDIC was, at the
time, "the largest bank rescue effort in history.""' The rescue failed and
all 41 of the First RepublicBank Corp's subsidiary banks were declared
insolvent and seized by the Comptroller. Unsecured creditors' commit-
tees of the holding corporation and one of its subsidiaries brought suit
against the FDIC claiming, among other things, that the FDIC, in pro-
viding open bank assistance to the flagship bank, had devised the assist-
ance in a manner designed to manufacture the insolvency of the sister
banks; had engaged in transfers in contemplation of insolvency; and had
discriminated as between creditors in violation of the National Bank
178. Id. at 1094. As two commentators have noted, the court went to unusual lengths
to reevaluate the expert testimony of accounting experts at the trial. See Dobbins &
Davis, The Franklin Decision and the Limits of Regulatory Authority, 3 Banking L. Rev.
3, 6 (Winter 1991).
179. Franklin Savings, 742 F. Supp. at 1124. Judge Saffels went on to note that Frank-
lin had not, however, shown that the regulators' actions were motivated by bias, prejudice
or bad faith. Id.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 164-170.
181. See Franklin Savings, 742 F. Supp. at 1119.
182. The Tenth Circuit immediately thereafter granted a stay, and subsequently re-
versed the decision. See Franklin Savings, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); see also supra
text accompanying notes 171-73 (discussing tenth circuit decision).
183. Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of First Republicbank Corp. v. FDIC, 749
F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
184. Id. at 760 (quoting Tr. Oral Arg. at 1 (John L. Rogers, I1, Esq., counsel for the
FDIC)).
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Act. 8 5 Although the court dismissed many of the other claims, and also
appeared somewhat skeptical of the validity of those just mentioned,
Judge Fitzwater declined to dismiss the claims concerning the manufac-
turing of insolvency, transfers in contemplation of insolvency, and the
alleged inequitable impact of the FDIC's purchase and assumption trans-
actions on creditors. 86 Even if the FDIC ultimately is vindicated on the
facts and law, the decision undoubtedly will impose a significant fetter on
the agency's freedom to act in large-scale bank seizures.
This view is reinforced by the other decisions. Texas American Banc-
shares"' involved the seizure of Texas American's twenty-two national
and two state bank subsidiaries. The seizures by the Comptroller (in the
case of ten of the national banks) and the Texas Banking Commissioner
(in the case of the two state banks) had taken place after the FDIC had
notified the Comptroller that these banks, which were otherwise solvent
and were creditors of the (by then) insolvent lead subsidiary bank, would
receive no more than sixty-seven percent of the face amounts of the obli-
gations owed them by the lead bank. This default rendered the remain-
ing banks insolvent. The holding company, the ten "solvent" national
banks, and the two state banks, then brought an action against the
Comptroller and the Texas Bank Commissioner, alleging that their insol-
vency had been engineered by the FDIC in order to enable the FDIC to
sell the entire TAB bank system as a package. The FDIC was alleged to
have deliberately devalued the assets placed by the solvent banks in the
insolvent lead bank. The Court found strong support for this allega-
tion"Is and took the view that the FDIC was under an obligation to treat
all creditors, including the sister subsidiaries, equitably. 89 The court
concluded that "the facts of this case indicate an equally egregious use of
the FDIC's extensive (but not unlimited) powers by manipulating the
recovery of affiliated banks on the obligations owed to them in order to
make those banks insolvent as well."' Citing the Ninth Circuit in First
Empire 191 and quoting from its own circuit, the court concluded in terms
extremely critical of the banking agencies:
This Circuit has been similarly wary of the FDIC's and the Comptrol-
ler's claims of unbridled discretion. The Fifth Circuit warned [that]
... '[t]he Comptroller must not become so obsessed with protecting
the integrity of the national banking system that individual banks are
185. See 12 U.S.C. § 194. This provision has been amended by FIRREA, § 212(a),
which the court held to have prospective force only. 749 F. Supp. at 773-74; First Em-
pire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919
(1978); Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
186. See Senior Unsecured Creditors, 749 F. Supp. at 768, 771, 772, 776.
187. Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
188. Id. at 1247.
189. On the equal treatment principle formerly contained in the National Bank Act,
see supra note 115.
190. Texas American Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1253.
191. First Empire Bank-New York v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 919 (1978).
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arbitrarily treated unfairly.' .... in the FDIC's rush to salvage what
all admit to be a difficult situation, it could not violate Congress' ex-
plicit directive to treat creditors equally by choosing among creditors
only those whom it considered worthy of full payment. 192
In the same vein, Chief Judge Porter in the much-publicized MCorp
case, 193 granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff holding com-
pany (and holding company/subsidiary) and against the Comptroller
and FDIC. MCorp claimed that the FDIC had conspired with the
Comptroller to engineer, by means of the conditions attached to the
FDIC's open bank assistance and the manipulation of the access on the
part of MCorp's subsidiary national banks to the Federal Reserve Bank
discount window, the insolvency of the entire MBank system, in order
that the FDIC would be able offer the entire package to prospective buy-
ers. The court found that the FDIC deliberately chose not to close the
MBanks as they became insolvent; instead, the agency decided to wait
until it was in a position to create the insolvency of an additional twelve
MBanks as well. Judge Porter, finding that the court had jurisdiction to
entertain the suit for damages, 94 rejected the various defenses raised by
the FDIC and the Comptroller, found that, as in the previous two eases,
the principle of equal treatment of creditors had been violated. Addition-
ally, the Court found that the claim by MCorp that the FDIC had plot-
ted with the Comptroller to engineer the insolvency of the entire MBank
system was supported by the evidence. 195 Indeed, the opinion records
some embarrassing evidence from the minutes of two 1988 FDIC meet-
ings at which this objective was frankly discussed, and apparently agreed
upon, by the FDIC Board and its staff.'96 The court ordered the parties
to prepare briefing on the amount of damages,' 9 7 and the case has subse-
quently been settled on terms a good deal more adverse to the FDIC, it
seems, than the agency had originally expected.
It remains to be seen whether the Fifth Circuit, unlike the Tenth Cir-
cuit, will sustain the district courts in their rigorous attitude toward the
agencies. For the time being, however, the banking regulators can hardly
be described as enjoying clear sailing in every case in which they have
chosen to use their ultimate enforcement weapon: seizure of the
institution.
192. Texas America Bancshares, 740 F. Supp. at 1254 (quoting, in part, from First
Nat'l Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1983)).
193. MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
194. The court's jurisdictional analysis is somewhat questionable insofar as it seems to
confuse some distinct jurisdictional issues. See id. at 1407-12.
195. See id. at 1408.
196. See id. at 1414-15.
197. See 755 F. Supp. at 1423.
S226 [V/ol. 59
ENFOR CEMENT A CTIVITIES
D. Potential Tort Liability of the Banking Agencies for the Seizure
and Operation of Depository Institutions
The Supreme Court recently averted a potential nightmare for the reg-
ulators concerning the possibility of tort liability under the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA")198 for the negligent operation of depository insti-
tutions already seized. The FTCA waives sovereign immunity on the
part of the United States with respect to tort liability, but it contains a
"discretionary function exception," in terms of which immunity is re-
tained in the case of claims based upon acts involving the "exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused." 199
The discretionary function exception has proved difficult to apply in
practice,' but in the case of seizures of depository institutions, there has
been clear agreement in the courts that it operates to protect the regula-
tors from suits claiming negligence in the initial determination of insol-
vency and the decision to seize the institution." On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit ruled in 1989 that the exception would not apply where,
having seized the institution, the regulators then mismanaged it so badly
as to cause loss.' ° The effect of this decision would have been to expose
the FDIC and the RTC to enormous claims for damages in the case of
institutions under their conservatorship and receivership which contin-
ued to deteriorate (as many, perhaps most, certainly do) after seizure.
In United States v. Gaubert,03 however, the Supreme Court has
scotched such potential suits by reversing the Fifth Circuit in broad and
unequivocal terms. In its unanimous decision,' the Court emphasized
that, whenever the agency or its employees exercised judgment "involv-
ing the necessary element of choice and grounded in the social, eco-
nomic, or political goals of the [governing] statute and regulations," they
are protected by the immunity.' 5 These choices include the "[day-to-
day management of banking affairs" which, "like the management of
other businesses, regularly require judgment as to which of a range of
permissible courses is the wisest," and "discretionary conduct is not con-
fined to the policy or planning level."'  The effect of the Court's inter-
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1974).
200. For a survey of recent developments in the field, see Byse, Recent Developments in
Federal Administrative Law: Damage Actions Against the Government or Government
Employees, 4 Admin. LJ. 275, 287-91 (1990), and references cited therein.
201. See FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1990); Golden Pacific
Bancorp. v. Clarke, 837 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 890 (1988).
202. See Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1267 (1991).
203. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
204. Scalia delivered a separate concurrence, but agreed with "much of the opinion of
the Court." Id. at 1280.
205. Id. at 1270.
206. Id. at 1275.
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pretation of the discretionary function exception in the context of
banking conservatorships and receiverships is to restrict very severely the
range of actions on the part of the regulators that could conceivably give
rise to liability in tort. Examples of the latter would be the failure to
carry out a non-discretionary mandate contained in an applicable statute
or regulation, or negligent decisions resting on "mathematical calcula-
tions" involving "no choice or judgment in carrying out the
calculations."207
The Gaubert decision obviously came as a major relief to the regula-
tors,2 °8 although, as the MCorp case indicates,2"9 the relationship be-
tween liability under Administrative Procedure Act principles and
liability in tort has yet to be worked out, and it may well be that the
regulators still run the risk of liability where they have abused their pow-
ers in order to create an insolvency. In any event, as the Franklin Sav-
ings case210 illustrates, non-monetary relief might still be available where
arbitrariness can be established.211
III. THE REGULATORY DILEMMA
Whether or not one agrees with the outcome of all the judicial disputes
surveyed in the preceding sections, there can be no doubt that litigants
have frequently achieved success in the courts and that, with respect to
many aspects of enforcement activity, the courts have played an active
role in curbing the actions of the banking agencies, their rhetoric of def-
erence notwithstanding. In an environment of increasingly formal en-
forcement action, it clearly pays some institutions and their "affiliates" to
seek judicial review of the agencies' actions, and the threat of costly judi-
cial proceedings might well become an inhibiting factor, for good or ill,
in the minds of agency enforcers. An important question to be consid-
ered, then, given the extra burden that judicial review places upon the
bailout and supervisory processes, is this: is the frequency of litigation
likely to continue, or will the law relating to enforcement become clari-
fied, thereby reducing the incidence of litigation?
The answer proposed here is that, while the questions concerning pre-
FIRREA capital agreements are likely soon to be settled by the Supreme
Court, and while highly specific disputes concerning agency powers
(such as whether the Fed's source of strength doctrine may be enforced)
207. Id. at 1278.
208. See Garsson, High Court Backs Regulators In Suit by Failed S&L's Chief, Am.
Banker, Mar. 27, 1991, at 2.
209. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991); see also supra text
accompanying notes 193-197 (discussing MCorp).
210. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 942 F.Supp. 1089 (D. Kan.
1990), rev'd, 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 177-
82 (discussing case).
211. Note the distinction between "abuse of discretion" for FTCA purposes and




are also likely soon to be settled by the Supreme Court and Congress,
substantial litigation concerning the way in which the agencies' enforce-
ment powers are used is likely to continue and, as the post-FIRREA
enforcement orders begin to reach the courts, might significantly increase
until the enactment of substantial reforms, concerning both the alloca-
tion of power among the banking agencies and the availability of deposit
insurance.
There are three reasons for this conclusion. First, while some process
of adjustment to a more formal and vigorous enforcement environment is
likely to take place, the resulting decrease in uncertainty and the sense of
unfairness (which might be driving some of the current judicial activism)
is unlikely to have a major impact on the number of cases reaching the
courts. Second, the banking agencies (and the FDIC in particular) are
caught up in a cross-current of conflicting purposes, generating at the
very least the appearance of improper motivation for some of the most
serious enforcement action taken-an appearance which is likely to cre-
ate, as it already has, a good deal of sympathy on the part of judges
towards the "victims" of enforcement action. Until a strong institutional
separation is created between the agency responsible for the cleanup and
the agencies responsible for enforcement, this state of affairs could
persist.
Third, the industry and the agencies have to operate in an increasingly
diverse commercial environment, yet they also have to continue acting
on the basis of assumptions that are less likely than before to be mutually
shared. The concept of safety and soundness, except where it is explicitly
defined by statute or rule, is hardly likely to be "generally understood" in
the diverse world of modem financial services. At the same time, the
agencies have been forced into the position of having to exercise much
more conscious watch over the well-being of depository institutions be-
cause taxpayers' money is at stake. The agencies have become, in other
words, "equity holders" in each insured institution. This is beginning
profoundly to influence, in a controversial way, their perception of what
constitute unsafe and unsound practices. It is quite possible that the dis-
agreements surrounding the bases for enforcement actions will be re-
flected by the courts on judicial review and, given the almost infinitely
varied contexts in which the disputes are likely to arise, it is hard to see
how the Supreme Court could add much certainty.
A. Adjustment Problems?
The evolution of a more formal enforcement environment, and the
great enhancement of enforcement powers, probably are factors contrib-
uting to the increase in enforcement litigation and, in turn, to the closer
scrutiny that courts appear to be giving enforcement actions. The penal-
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ties are serious and so must be taken more seriously by the courts;
2 12
background constitutional anxieties (which troubled Congress itself
when it increased the scope and scale of the enforcement powers) 213 are
likely to continue to operate as a constraint against deference in the
minds of judges;214 and the agencies have to cover so broad a field of
operations that mistakes requiring correction on review seem inevitable.
212. Cf Fitzpatrick v. FDIC, 765 F.2d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (small size of civil
penalty significant in determining that the penalty was not arbitrary and capricious).
The power of agencies to enforce, through their own proceedings, very large and essen-
tially punitive civil penalties creates some cause for concern. The Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, which has commissioned two major studies on the
administrative imposition of civil penalties, has always assumed that extremely large pen-
alties should be imposed through the judicial process and not through the agencies' own
administrative adjudications. In encouraging the adoption of civil penalties as an agency
sanction, it was never envisaged that agencies should substitute for the courts in imposing
essentially punitive sanctions. See Admin. Conference of the U.S., Civil Money Penalties
as a Sanction, Recommendation No. 72-6, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-6 (1990).
213. The House Judiciary Committee took into account, in its deliberations on the
House version of FIRREA (H.R. 1278), the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See H. Rep. No. 101-54, pt. 5, Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Report of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, at 6 (June 1, 1989). Halper was a case involving double jeopardy: in joint
criminal and civil judicial proceedings, Halper had received both criminal punishment
and a civil fine for engaging in Medicare-related fraud; subsequently, a government
agency imposed on him a civil penalty which was so large that, as the Court held, it bore
no rational relationship to the loss suffered by the government and it therefore crossed
"the line between remedy and punishment," 490 U.S. 450, thereby exposing Halper to
double jeopardy. Although the Court emphasized that its decision was confined to the
question of double jeopardy, id. at 436, the Court's insistence on looking to the substan-
tive nature of the penalty, as opposed to its "civil" label (a "functional" rather than
"formal" approach), when determining whether the penalty was primarily punitive or
remedial, id., suggests that there might be due process, Article III, and trial-by-jury
problems with the administrative imposition of very large penalties which bear no rela-
tion to the actual losses inflicted. The Judiciary Committee did not investigate these
broader implications, confining itself only to a concern for the constitutionality of the
civil penalty provisions relating to judicial proceedings. On the implications of Halper for
judicial enforcement proceedings, see Glickman, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings after United
States v. Halper, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251 (1990).
214. Cf Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1984).
In addition to concerns raised by the Halper decision, discussed in the immediately
preceding note, another recent decision of the Supreme Court conceivably has potential
implications for the agency sanction system established by FIRREA. In Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), a majority of the Court recommitted itself to the
principle of trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment where the adjudication of "pri-
vate rights" is at stake and the suit resembles an action at common law. Id. at 50-55.
The power to order restitution and reimbursement, incorporated by FIRREA into the
banking agencies' cease and desist powers involves an allocation of liability between par-
ties (institution-affiliated parties and the depository institutions which they have harmed)
and might conceivably give rise to a right to trial by jury. But it is more likely that such
"private rights" would be regarded as having acquired a "public" complexion by virtue of
the valid delegation of this adjudicative power to the agencies the government's interest in
the safety and soundness of the institutions concerned, the provision of federal deposit
insurance, and the closely regulated nature of banking. See id. at 52-55; see also Paul v.
OTS, No. 90-2496-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla. filed Dec. 4, 1990) (reproduced in Current
Developments, supra note 76, 118-27) (rejecting plaintiff's Seventh Amendment claim).
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On the other hand, the development by the agencies of a structured set
of principles governing enforcement, whether through rules2"' or as a
result of the increased volume and publicity of agency adjudication,
should do much to reduce the uncertainty regarding the manner in which
enforcement sanctions will be applied in areas where the basis for en-
forcement itself is not in dispute. Furthermore, the results on judicial
review are likely to have a feedback effect on the agencies as their admin-
istrative law judges take into account principles articulated by the courts
in prior cases.
The adjustment factor, I would therefore suggest, is not likely in itself
to generate unusual difficulties concerning judicial review of enforcement
action. More important are the structural and conflict of interest
problems associated with the changed environment of banking
enforcement.
B. Supervision or Bailout?
A deeper problem is the conflict of purposes toward which the banking
agencies, and the FDIC in particular, are directed. On the one hand,
each of the supervisory agencies is under immense public pressure to pre-
vent the growth of, and indeed to eliminate as far as possible, the insider
abuses that, have played so important a role in the S&L and banking
crises. They are expected, in other words, to engage in a general cleanup
of the industry in order to protect the deposit insurance funds from fur-
ther losses. To this end, they have been directed to use their enforcement
powers to the fullest extent, and they are also being encouraged to engage
in preemptive action, or "early intervention." 21 6
At the same time, the FDIC (and the RTC2" 7) are also required to
engage in a general "cleanout" of the industry. The FDIC has the
unenviable task of implementing a badly underfunded "bailout" of both
the thrift and banking industries through the discharge of its open bank,
conservatorship and receivership duties, a good proportion of which in-
volve the sale of ailing institutions, or at least their best assets, as quickly
as possible and with the least possible further expense to the insurance
funds and the taxpayers: it is simply not politically feasible to obtain
adequate resources from the public fisc. The FDIC must, in other words,
try to sustain the bailout "on the cheap," by selling off the deadwood in
the industry to the healthy section of the industry.
215. See, eg., Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Interagency Policy
Regarding the Assessment of Civil Money Penalties by the Federal Financial Institutions
Regulatory Agencies, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,423 (1980); OTS, Orders Nos. 90-331, 90-332, and
90-333 (effective Feb. 12, 1990)(stating enforcement policies, specific policies relating to
imposition of civil money penalties, and OTS' statutory powers and procedures used in
initiating and pursuing formal investigation).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 83-92.
217. Given the partial institutional isolation and the highly specific tasks of the RTC,
the comments in this section do not apply to the RTC itself.
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It should come as no surprise, therefore, that charges of conspiracy by
the FDIC with other supervisory agencies to engineer the insolvencies of
saleable bank systems have been made, and that these charges appear to
have been established by credible evidence in the courts.218 Could the
pressure to appear to be doing something successful also be the explana-
tion for the OTS' apparent eagerness to seize thrifts (either because of
disagreements concerning accounting principles,21 9 or because, though
seemingly viable at the time of seizure, they had fallen foul of the Office's
new capital standards, often precisely because they had earlier taken on
dead thrifts of which the OTS' predecessor could not otherwise dis-
pose)?22 No doubt the OTS would protest this explanation and would
assert error on the part of the courts involved, but it is unlikely that the
sympathy of so many courts towards the victims of these forms of en-
forcement action could be so completely misplaced.
At any rate, what remains disturbing is that some of the cases suggest
perhaps more than just the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
agencies. While perhaps politically satisfying in the short term, sum-
mary action is not always going to be fair to those exposed to the agen-
cies' enforcement powers, and, if some enforcement action has actually
been taken merely to slake a public thirst for vengeance, or to produce
apparent successes in conducting the cleanup, this would actually be con-
trary to the public interest insofar as the unsalable deadwood institutions
would continue to lose more and more money.221 If the complaints are
based on something more than self-serving rhetoric, then it seems en-
tirely possible that courts, faced firsthand with the effects of drastic en-
forcement action on the particular institutions, will continue to adopt a
relatively interventionist role in protecting these institutions against the
regulators. 222
C. Depositors and Taxpayers or Bankers and Stockholders? The "New
Entrepreneurial State"
An even deeper difficulty, and one that is likely to be more pervasive
and enduring, is the incongruous new enforcement environment that has
evolved in response to the S&L and banking crises. The nation still needs
218. See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Texas Am. Banc-
shares v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Tex. 1990). Cf. Senior Unsecured Credi-
tors' Comm. of First Republicbank Corporation v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Tex.
1990) (court apparently skeptical about the creditors' claims).
219. See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director of the OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1089, 1109-15 (D.
Kan. 1990).
220. See the "regulatory goodwill" cases discussed supra text accompanying notes 136-
54.
221. Cf Hansen Say. Bank v. OTS, 758 F. Supp. 240, 247 (D.N.J. 1991) ("By enforc-
ing FIRREA's capital standards on [Hansen Savings], the OTS will create the situation it
seeks to avoid: creating an insolvent thrift which becomes part of the public charge. The
result is far from being in the public interest.").




the financial services that are provided by thrifts and banks. There is no
state-owned bank industry. The agencies therefore also have a responsi-
bility to permit-indeed, foster-the prosperity, and therefore the en-
trepreneurial activities of the (privately-owned and operated) industry.
Even if they so wished, they would never have the managerial resources
to do otherwise. At this point, the function of the regulators is to main-
tain boundary control, leaving the members of the industry free to get on
with banking and thrift business as long as they remain within the pa-
rameters set by Congress and the regulators. As far as it goes, this regu-
latory model is quite consistent with the roles performed (at least in
theory) by many federal agencies.
Because of the special importance of banking to the money supply,
however, it has also always been accepted that the role of banking regula-
tors must be much more intrusive than is the case for other industries. In
order to sustain the circulating medium 3 and in order to protect deposi-
tors, the regulators have long been charged with ensuring the safety and
soundness of the institutions they supervise. It is not enough that these
institutions refrain from violating norms of fair or proper behavior:
wherever possible, they must be protected from engaging in conduct that
might lead them to fall into insolvency. So we have tended to refer to the
banking agencies as supervisors, as well as regulators. Under this super-
visory model, it was entirely appropriate that the regulators should for so
long have worked in such close, continuous and informal cooperation
with the industry. 24
The S&L and banking crises have, however, led to a subversion of the
supervisory model. In angry response to the public cost of the S&L cri-
sis, and to the abuses that are responsible for so much of this cost, Con-
gress has enthusiastically conferred massive enforcement powers on the
banking agencies." 2 In the process, Congress has quite consciously and
dramatically enhanced the law enforcement role of these agencies, and it
has done so because of the exposure of the taxpayers through the deposit
insurance system. The old form of close, but informal, regulation, which
was followed by an interlude of irresponsible deregulation," 6 might have
been displaced by a new "reregulation" that could well result in an acute
223. This monetary policy aspect of deposit insurance sometimes tends to be forgotten.
[lit is clear from both the statements and actions of many proponents and ad-
ministrators of bank-obligation insurance systems that the primary object has
not been to guard the individual depositor or noteholder against loss but, in-
stead, to restore to the community, as quickly as possible, circulating medium
destroyed or made unavailable as a consequence of bank failures. In this view,
bank-obligation insurance has a monetary function, and the protection of the
small creditor against loss is incidental to the achievement of the primary
objective.
Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its Antecedents
and its Purposes, 75 Pol. Sc. Q. 181, 189 (1960)
224. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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case of regulatory mismatch.2 27 Formal, retributive sanctions constitute
part of the technique available for shaping decisions and strategies that
really ought to be based on sensitive, highly discrete and differentiated
business judgments.
At the same time, as guardians of the deposit insurance funds, whether
direct (as in the case of the FDIC) or indirect (as in the case of the Fed,
OCC and OTS), the agencies have had to become, in many respects, "eq-
uity holders" in the banking industry.228 Paradoxically, therefore, the
agencies also have a greater interest than ever in fostering the prosperity
of the banking industry, and the entrepreneurial risks that are inevitably
associated with the furtherance of this prosperity in an increasingly com-
petitive and complex financial services environment.229
This, in turn, has produced a major convolution in the role of the regu-
lators. The combined imposition upon the banking agencies of the law
enforcement model, on the one hand, and the equity holder perspective,
on the other, seems in the banking arena to have led to the emergence of
an unusual form of regulation that we might call the entrepreneurial
state. The entrepreneurial state created by the combination of events just
outlined takes the form of agencies with a powerful law enforcement mis-
sion, vested with the responsibility not only for policing the boundaries
of fair play but also with: punishing and incapacitating the miscreants;
cleaning out the industry deadwood; protecting and regenerating the fed-
eral insurance funds; fostering the general prosperity of the industry; fa-
cilitating the diversification of the industry in the face of increasing and
possibly fatal competition from other sectors of the financial services in-
dustry; and, of course, regulating the money supply!
Because the easiest aspect for Congress to deal with in assisting the
agencies with these tasks is the "law and order" aspect, among the most
extensive and readily available tools that have been conferred on the
agencies are their enhanced enforcement powers. The result that might
well be developing is that of a law-enforcement tail attempting to wag an
entrepreneurial dog. In other words, the bureaucratic techniques of
traditional formal agency enforcement sanctions are being used to direct,
227. See, e.g., S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 191-96 (1982)(discussing regula-
tory mismatches); C. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regula-
tory State 89 (1990)(same).
228. See, e.g., Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in
a Deregulatory Age, 57 Fordhamn L. Rev. 501 (1989) (describing the shift, on the part of
the banking regulators, from the role of debtholders to that of equityholders). For early
recognition of this development, see Serino, supra note 23, at 155 ("Since the regulator
functions initially to protect the depositors and the shareholders, he should be given the
tools to ensure that management is performing with the best interests of the bank in
mind. Where management does not, it, not the bank, should suffer.").
229. New developments and innovations in the financial services industry, many of
which are placing competitive stresses on the traditional banking and thrift industries, are
being reported in the media on an almost daily basis. For a good overview, see A Survey
of International Banking, The Economist, Apr. 7, 1990.
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on an after-the-fact basis, the entrepreneurial decisions of the owners and
managers of depository institutions.
The effects of this schizoid model are already beginning to manifest
themselves. For example, the Chief Counsel of the OTS, Harris Wein-
stein, has espoused two controversial theories upon the basis of which he
contends that the OTS is justified in taking vigorous enforcement action
against institution-affiliated parties.1 0 The first relates to the fiduciary
duties of officers, directors, and other parties involved in the management
of depository institutions,"1 and the second relates more specifically to
the ethical responsibilities of attorneys rendering services to depository
institutions."3
As far as institution-affiliated parties in general are concerned, Coun-
sellor Weinstein, employing one of the law's "most exotic species,""m
argues that, because depositors expect that they will receive repayment of
their deposits, and because federal deposit insurance guarantees this re-
payment, the directors and officers of depository institutions owe a fiduci-
ary duty to the federal insurer: "[E]very fiduciary of a federally insured
depository institution owes the federal insurer, at the very minimum, the
very same high fiduciary duties that are owed depositors," including "the
duty not to risk insolvency and the resulting loss of funds deposited with
the institution."'
230. It is not clear whether Counsellor Weinstein also expresses the views of the other
banking regulators. The 0TS view that the agencies have a responsibility to impose fidu-
ciary standards based on the federal statutes (and not merely according to relevant state
law), see OTY Issues C&D Order Against Nell Bush for Engaging in Conflicts of Interest,
56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 761, 762 (Apr. 22, 1991), is certainly shared at the OCC see
OCC Can Narrow, Deny Outer Limits of State-Granted Fiduciary Powers, 55 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 991 (1990), and is surely correct. On the other hand, when it comes to the
proper interpretation of the required standards insofar as these apply to attorneys, the
General Counsel of the FDIC is on record as declining to go quite as far as the OTS Chief
Counsel. See FDIC General Counsel Declines to Embrace Higher Duty for Fiduciaries in
Failing Banks, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 941-42 (1990).
231. See, e.g., Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institu-
don Fiduciaries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510 (Sept. 24, 1990) (text of speech delivered at
Southern Methodist University, Sept. 13, 1990); Bank, Thrift Attorneys React to Duties
Outlined by 073 Chief Counsel Weinstein, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 547 (Oct. 1, 1990)
(reporting on further remarks by Chief Counsel Weinstein to the Exchequer Club, Sept.
19, 1990).
232. See, eg., Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein
Says, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) 616 (1991) (reporting on a panel discussion sponsored by
the Administrative Conference of the United States entitled "Where were the Lawyers?,"
Washington, D.C., Mar. 21, 1991); Ohio, Louisiana Draft Bills Would Limit Liability of
Bank and Thrift Attorneys, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), Apr. 17, 1991 (reporting
proceedings of the Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association's Section of Business
Law, where Weinstein elaborated further on his "whole law" concept) [hereinafter Draft
Bills].
233. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke UJ.
879, 923.
234. Speech by OT Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository Institution Fiduci-
aries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (Sept. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Weinstein Speech].
Weinstein bases this conclusion on three "Hornbook principles": the federal insurer is
1991] S235
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
By way of illustration, Weinstein uses the hypothetical of a savings
bank that has had to increase its loan loss reserves because the value of
its primary real estate market has declined. Hoping that the economic
downturn causing the decline is about to hit bottom, the bank's board is
considering the possibility of engaging in a large urban residential devel-
opment which, though risky, would be very profitable if the real estate
market actually recovers. On the other hand, the board is aware that the
failure of the project would have a "devastating impact" on the bank's
current capital position. In these circumstances, Weinstein asks, "[w]hat
are the board's duties- and to whom are they owed?" "The only con-
scionable legal conclusion," he argues, "is that the directors owe a fiduci-
ary duty to the holder of the potentially unlimited negative equity risk,
e.g. [sic] the United States government, and that directors who fail to
consider the potential effect of the transaction on the government breach
their duty."2 35 The directors would therefore be in breach of their duty if
they decided to evaluate the risk exclusively from the point of view of the
common shareholders and take the risk of investing in the project be-
cause the potential benefits greatly outweigh the potential loss.
As to Counsellor Weinstein's position regarding the professionals en-
gaged by depository institutions (and attorneys in particular), he main-
tains that they have an ethical and enforceable obligation to practice
"whole law," by which he means that an attorney advising or acting on
behalf of a depository institution must determine "his or her true obliga-
tions by reference to regulatory requirements, concepts of safety and
soundness, and fiduciary responsibilities. 2 36 Attorneys who, when ad-
vising their depository institution clients, restrict themselves to furnish-
ing advice on how to exploit regulatory or legislative loopholes, namely
those who fail to make further enquiries as to whether prudent legal ad-
vice has been furnished with regard to other, related aspects of the activi-
ties they are reviewing when they see "red flags" indicating that such
advice should be obtained, are liable to attract the attention of the en-
forcement staff of the OTS.2 37 For example, it is not enough for an attor-
ney to advise whether a federally-chartered thrift may legally convert to
a state charter; "broader questions of law" must also be considered.238
Counsellor Weinstein's views, backed up as they are by the enormous
subrogated to the rights of the depositors, who have the right to seek restitution and
money damages from fiduciaries; deposit insurance is analogous to equity, and corporate
fiduciaries therefore owe a duty to the government; and the government is in the position
of a creditor to a nearly-insolvent or insolvent debtor, hence the fiduciaries of such "debt-
ors" "should ... be primarily concerned with the interests of that institution's largest
creditor, e.g. [sic] the U.S. government. The closer an institution is to [in]solvency, the
more paramount does the duty to the government become." Id.
235. Id. at 512.
236. Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTS' Weinstein Says, 56
Banking Rep. (BNA) 616 (April 1, 1991) [hereinafter How to Exploit Loopholes].
237. See id. at 617.
238. Id.
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enforcement powers of the OTS and the actual use of these powers, 9
have caused some degree of consternation in the legal profession. The
novel, uncertain and controversial nature of these standards of profes-
sional conduct,2" not to mention their retroactive application, have led
to protests from the bar.24 Members of the accounting profession have
registered their own complaints 2 (perhaps somewhat less vigorously,
however, since it has long been recognized that accountants perform an
important "public watchdog" function, requiring them to ascertain inde-
pendently the veracity of their client's financial statements, 24 3 and, in the
case of clients subject to federal securities laws, to inform the SEC of
deficiencies in the client's financial statements where the client fails to do
so2). Returning to Counsellor Weinstein's strict views with respect to
the fiduciary duties of directors and officers, it also comes as no surprise
that bankers have protested that it is difficult to anticipate the expecta-
tions of the regulators as far as their duties are concerned.245
Yet the position espoused by Weinstein is understandable given the
unusual position in which the federal banking agencies find themselves.
The federal deposit insurance funds are providing the backup for deposi-
tory institution activity. The questions of safety and soundness that now
fall under the surveillance of the banking agencies in an increasingly di-
versified, volatile and competitive financial services market, and the polit-
ical atmosphere in which government is expected to "do something,"
have all combined to propel the banking agencies into a position where
239. See supra note 88; see also Labaton, Putting Lawyers Under Scrutiny, N.Y. Tunes,
Mar. 21, 1991, at C2, col. 1.
240. It is not clear, for example, whether Counsellor Weinstein's standards of profes-
sional conduct to be observed by attorneys would comport with the lawyer's duties of
confidentiality (ABA Model Rule 1.6) and loyalty (ABA Model Rule 1.7) to his or her
client. More fundamentally, while an attorney may render advice concerning extra-legal
issues of morality, economics, social and political factors (ABA Model Rule 2.1), and in
the context of banking surely ought to, it is unclear what the ultimate scope of this advice
ought to be. As one attorney, addressing Counsellor Weinstein's expectations and refer-
ring to the obvious risk inherent in all banking decisions, has protested, "[o]ne man's
unsafe and unsound practice is another's business opportunity." Draft Bills, supra note
225. It is difficult fairly to base serious enforcement action on so intangible a duty.
241. See Weinstein Speech, supra note 227, at 547-48; How to Exploit Loopholes, supra
note 229, at 618. As one attorney put it, if Counsellor Weinstein's "whole law" approach
"means that when you're in doubt you consult the agency, I think there are a lot of
practitioners who will disagree about that." Id. Legislation is being prepared in two
states (Ohio and Louisiana) that would attempt to restrict the scope of the OTS' "whole
law" concept. Id.; see also Villa, supra note 76, (suggesting that "the resolve of profes-
sionals to contest the agencies' actions is building").
242. See 07S is Trying to Regulate the Accounting Profession, Thrift Regulator, Dec.
14, 1990 (No. 9047).
243. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984); see generally,
Murphy, Standards Governing Conduct of Officers, Directors and Others, in Current De-
velopments, supra note 76, at 389, 399-402.
244. See Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Murphy, supra note 242, at 400-01.
245. See Porter, Regulators Increase the Risk for Bank Officers Directors, Am. Banker,
Feb. 6, 1991, at 4.
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they have to adopt the views urged by the OTS Chief Counsel. It is no
wonder that Counsellor Weinstein is attempting to recruit to his aid ad-
ditional "policemen" 46 in the form of attorneys and accountants who
might have privileged access to information which the agency itself
would not discover until long after the damage has been done. And it is
also no wonder that he is attempting to deter as much risk-taking as
possible.
Even if the position of the agencies is an understandable one, however,
it might not be practical. The central problem is that safety and sound-
ness is inextricably tied to the question of business judgment.247 Banking
regulators do, it is true, acquire considerable expertise in such matters
and so are well-qualified to evaluate banking decisions for their safety
and soundness. But in one respect they nearly always enjoy an advantage
that makes punitive enforcement action unfair and ineffective as a tool
for directing the welfare of the industry: they make their evaluations
with the benefit of hindsight and, if the theories of Counsellor Weinstein
do indeed express a legitimate basis of enforcement action, they do so
according to very high standards of prudence. In short, they operate
according to a "should-have-known standard" 248 which is not only as
unfair, in the case of honest institutions and institution-affiliated parties,
as is Monday morning quarterbacking, but which precisely because such
judgments cannot be made in advance is ineffective as a means of di-
recting an institution in the future. On the contrary, the chilling effect
that is likely to result from heavy-handed enforcement based upon pro-
phylactic principles of professional duty might well lead professionals
and, in turn, their depository institution clients, to err on the side of ex-
cessive caution, perhaps even to the ultimate detriment of the general
prosperity of the industry.
CONCLUSION
Two fundamental problems have been identified as far as the intensi-
fied enforcement activities of the banking regulators are concerned.
First, there is a conflict of purposes between the cleanout effort and the
continuing responsibility to ensure the maintenance of depository institu-
tion safety and soundness. There is some indication that the banking
246. See How to Exploit Loopholes, supra note 235, at 617-18 (suggestion by member of
the bar that this is what Weinstein is expecting attorneys to become).
The complicated policy implications associated with enforcement efforts to impose this
form of "gatekeeper" liability on accountants, lawyers, and other individuals involved
with corporate organizations are explored in Krakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and
the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 Yale L.J. 857 (1984).
247. Cf Vartanian, Woes in Financial Industry Challenge Outside Directors, Am.
Banker, Apr. 6, 1990, at 4 ("many argue that the business judgment rule that normally
protects board decisions has been preempted and even trampled by the regulatory busi-
ness judgment rule").
248. How to Exploit Loopholes, supra note 235, at 618 (one attorney's criticism of
Weinstein's "whole law" theory).
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agencies might not always have acted solely in the interests of safety and
soundness when they have closed some institutions; they may sometimes
have acted for other motives, such as fulfilling the appearance of imple-
menting an effective cleanup operation.
Second, the pressure to engage in vigorous enforcement, the exposure
of taxpayers in the event of insolvencies, and the increasingly complex
nature of the markets in which the depository institutions operate (as
well as the polycentric characteristics of the business decisions that must
be made in that environment), have all combined to create a situation in
which both the basis for enforcement action and the appropriate ensuing
sanctions are bound to remain controversial and likely to spawn continu-
ous challenges in court.
The resolution of these difficulties is inevitably bound up with the
broader structural and functional reform of the banking industry as a
whole. For example, the possible reduction in the coverage of federal
deposit insurance249 would, by reducing the degree of taxpayer exposure
to the costs of banking failure, help to reduce the pressure on the agen-
cies to take inappropriate punitive action against depository institutions.
A transfer of the power to determine whether an institution is "too big to
fail,'"-involving "systemic risk" and monetary policy judgments-from
the FDIC to the Fed and Treasury,250 would help to separate monetary
and macroeconomic policy concerns from safety and soundness issues,
and might in turn help to reduce the number of arbitrary enforcement
results as between institutions.
Further lines of inquiry are, however, also worth pursuing. First, as
far as the outright seizure of institutions is concerned, it is questionable
that the agencies, because of their close relationship at the level of the
FDIC Board, should be in a position to engineer insolvencies merely in
order to be able to sell off more attractive institutions. A fairer solution
might be to require a clear institutional separation between the agencies
charged with supervising and closing institutions and the agency charged
with performing the receivership functions. (Here the RTC model might
be appropriate, except that under this model there might still be too
much contact between one of the supervisory agencies (FDIC) and the
receivership agency (RTC)).
Second, it is time for Congress and the courts to be more frank about
the punitive aspects of the banking agencies' cease-and-desist, removal
and prohibition, and civil money penalty powers. There is no doubt that
these enforcement powers were authorized and are being used (perhaps
even quite appropriately) in order to punish past wrongdoing as well as
to prevent further abuse and mismanagement. Nor is this necessarily
objectionable or incongruous, since the general and specific deterrent ef-
249. A reduction in the coverage of federal deposit insurance would be effected by the
Treasury' proposed legislation. Financial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act,
H.R. 1505, § 101 [hereinafter FISCCA].
250. See id. § 103(a) (new § 13(c)(4)(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
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fects of such punitive action help to influence future decisions. But if the
enforcement powers can be used punitively, it is quite possible that they
will encourage heavy-handed regulation, with the regulator using the big
stick as a prophylactic measure-especially when the regulators are sub-
jected to intense political pressure to engage in early intervention. It is at
this point that the wooden features of the formal enforcement powers
become unfair and quite possibly counterproductive.
A clearer distinction might profitably be drawn between those enforce-
ment powers that refer to past violations and have a punitive effect (e.g.,
permanent removal and prohibition orders, civil penalties and restitution
orders) and those which are primarily designed to prevent further deteri-
oration in the institution concerned (e.g., capital maintenance agree-
ments, temporary removal orders and restrictions on "new financial
activity"251). The agencies could be subjected to stricter standards when
applying sanctions that are punitive in nature, so that they could not use
them as a means of bludgeoning institutions and their managements into
complying with agency requirements that are based merely on business
judgments and not on clear violations of rules or well-established unsafe
and unsound practices.
Third, and in implementation of the distinction between punitive and
remedial sanctions, it is possible that procedural and structural modifica-
tions within the agencies would help to maintain the barrier between
punishment and management. At least three possibilities could be
considered.
A helpful procedural modification, and one that has already been
urged by the Administrative Conference of the United States,252 might be
the adoption of an analogy to the "Wells Submission" employed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").25 Persons faced with
the prospect of having formal enforcement action taken against them are
given an opportunity by the SEC to present a statement of their interest
and position in the dispute to the enforcement staff before the formal
action is actually instituted, even if such action has already been author-
ized by the Commission. One advantage of such a procedure in the
banking enforcement context is that it would bring into direct contact, on
a regular and centralized basis, the agency enforcement officials and the
persons with respect to whom enforcement action is being contemplated
before the dispute has assumed too adversarial a posture. This would
help to obviate the possibility that formal enforcement action might be
251. See FISCCA, supra note 248, § 251(a).
252. Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States, No. 87-
12, Adjudication Practices and Procedures of the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 1
C.F.R. § 305.87-12 (1990) (Recommendation No. 5).
253. On Wells Submissions, see, e.g., J.D. Cox, R.W. Hillman & D.C. Langevoort,
Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1010-11 (1991); McLucas, Hamill, Shea &
Dubow, An Overview of Various Procedural Considerations Associated With the Securities
and Exchange Commission's Investigative Process, 45 Bus. Law. 627, 689-93.
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instituted upon the mere recommendation of officers in the field, many of
whom are not lawyers.
If more substantial measures turn out to be necessary, the model sup-
plied by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") offers an exam-
ple of a possible structural modification. The Labor-Management
Relations Act of 194725 created a structural division within the NLRB
between the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions of the agency.25-
The General Counsel's office, which prosecutes unfair labor practice dis-
putes before the Board, is independent of the Board's supervision and
review. Until a charge is brought by the General Counsel, the Board
may take no enforcement action." 6 Such a model goes further than the
present Administrative Procedure Act requirements applicable to the
banking agencies257 and might be appropriate for punitive enforcement
actions by the banking agencies. The enforcement staff at the agency
would be required to refer formally the prosecution of some of the
charges available to the agencies (civil money penalties, removals, etc.) to
the independent office, which, insulated from pressure by the agency it-
self, would then decide whether to bring formal charges. In the interim,
the agency itself could take emergency action where necessary through
the use of temporary orders (e.g., certain cease and desist orders and
suspensions), and it could prosecute other enforcement action which is
primarily corrective or preventative in nature (e.g., capital maintenance
agreements and restraints on new activities).
The second structural possibility is that of a more thorough-going
"split enforcement" model, such as those which operate in federal occu-
pational safety and health and mine safety administration." 8 Under
such models, the responsibility for adjudicating enforcement proceedings
brought by the agency is assigned to a wholly independent agency. For
example, the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission
("OSHRC") adjudicates enforcement actions brought by the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration ("OSHA"). Although there are
difficult problems of coordination and inter-agency deference involved," 9
254. 61 Stat. 136.
255. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 23, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 108
S. Ct. 413, 418-20 (1987); A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Cases and Materials on Labor
Law 104-07 (10th ed. 1986).
256. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 155-59 (1975).
257. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988)(providing for a functional separation between inves-
tigative and prosecuting staff on the one hand, and adjudicators on the other).
258. See Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Mode" Some Conclusions From the OSHA
and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987). A similar proposal has been
advocated for the enforcement of federal aviation safety regulations. See Fallon, Enforc-
ing Aviation Safety Regulations: The Case for a Split-Enforcement Model of Agency Adju-
dication, 4 Admin. L.J. 389 (1991). The Administrative Conference of the United States
adopted many of Fallon's proposals, but not this one, in its own recommendations to the
Congress. I C.F.R. § 305.90-1 (1990).
259. See the discussion and guidelines expressed in the Recommendation of the Ad-
ministrative Conference of the United States, No. 86-4, The Split Enforcement Model for
Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-4 (1990). Cf Martin v. Occupational Safety and
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the split enforcement model is thought by many to ensure that persons
subjected to agency enforcement action are provided with, or at least will
feel that they have been provided with, fairer procedures and better pro-
tection from over-zealous regulators than is the case with a unitary adju-
dication system.2" Given the potential and temptations for over-zealous
enforcement by the banking agencies, the same argument could be made
in the banking enforcement context. Indeed, it might even be argued
that enforcement adjudication should be centralized for all the federal
banking agencies, though an instant rejection of this suggestion would be
anticipated by anyone familiar with the turf-protecting proclivities of
each of these agencies.
000
These suggestions are somewhat tentative and obviously require care-
ful further investigation, particularly in light of the general direction that
banking reform might take in the coming months. It does seem, how-
ever, that a more discriminating approach to the application by the bank-
ing agencies of their enforcement powers might be necessary, if charges
of agency abuse and unfairness are to be countered, and if the enforce-
ment actions of the agencies are to be constructive in the long term.
Health Review Comm'n, lll S. Ct. 1171 (1991) (deciding that OSHRC should defer to
OSHA and the Secretary concerning interpretations of the Secretary's regulations).
260. See Fallon, supra note 258, at 419-20; Johnson, supra note 258, at 344-46.
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